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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent corporate scandals demonstrate that rank-and-file employees often remain 
silent in the face of significant fraud.  This silence is unfortunate because 
corporate employees have inside knowledge of misconduct that gives them an 
information advantage over more traditional corporate monitors, such as 
independent directors and government regulators.  To address this problem, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act utilized a new approach that encourages employee 
whistleblowers to disclose information about corporate wrongdoing.  This 
approach, which Professor Moberly labels the “Structural Model,” requires that 
corporations provide a standardized channel for employees to report 
organizational misconduct to official monitors within the corporation.  This 
Article offers an original framework for analyzing the effectiveness of Sarbanes-
Oxley’s Structural Model.  Utilizing behavioral science research that analyzes 
whistleblower motivations, Professor Moberly finds that the Structural Model 
reduces difficulties corporate employees experience in disclosing misconduct, and 
thereby provides an improved mechanism to encourage employees to become 
more active and effective corporate monitors.  However, the Structural Model has 
significant flaws, which Professor Moberly addresses by offering several 
suggestions for improving the model’s usefulness as a tool against corporate 
crime.    
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent corporate scandals reveal opposing perspectives on 
the ability of rank-and-file employees to be corporate monitors.  
From one perspective, the scandals demonstrate employees’ 
efficacy as monitors with accurate insider knowledge about the 
inner workings of their corporation.  At great risk to their careers, 
a few employee whistleblowers bravely attempted to expose 
wrongdoing at many corporations involved in recent scandals, 
such as Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and several mutual 
funds companies.1
1 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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Viewed differently, however, the scandals also illustrate the 
difficulty of relying upon employees to function as effective 
corporate monitors.  The financial misconduct at Enron and other 
companies lasted for years before being revealed publicly.2
Countless lower-level employees necessarily knew about, were 
exposed to, or were involved superficially in the wrongdoing and 
its concealment – but few disclosed it, either to company officials 
or to the public.3 Thus, while the corporate scandals demonstrate 
employees’ potential to monitor corporations, they also confirm 
that this potential often is not fully realized.   
In this Article, I evaluate the most recent attempt to encourage 
employees to become more effective corporate monitors, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed by Congress in response to the 
corporate scandals.4 The Act utilizes two approaches to 
encourage corporate whistleblowers.5 The first is best described 
as a version of the well-known Anti-retaliation Model, which 
involves protecting whistleblowers from employer retaliation 
 
2 For example, immediately prior to declaring bankruptcy in December 2001, 
Enron restated its earnings for each year between 1997 through 2001 because of the 
accounting problems that occurred during that time.  See William C. Powers, Jr., et al., 
Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron 
Corp., at 2, 32, available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/ 
sicreport020102.pdf (Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Powers Report].   
3 See discussion, infra Part II.B.  Cf. Rebecca Goodell, A Presentation of Empirical 
Research on Compliance Practices: What Companies Say They are Doing – What Employees 
Hear, in CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA: STRENGTHENING THE “GOOD CITIZEN”
CORPORATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND SYMPOSIUM ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES 136, 137 (1995) [hereinafter GOOD CITIZEN] (presenting survey result that 
one in three employees witnessed significant corporate misconduct).  Of course, many 
employees worked at corporations engaging in illegal conduct without any reason to 
suspect wrongdoing.  See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE 
ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 239 (2004).  Rather than focus 
on these employees, this Article is concerned with employees who have reason to 
suspect misrepresentations or fraud, but do nothing about it. 
4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of the United States Code). 
5 A third model, the Bounty Model, has proven to be a particularly effective 
means of encouraging whistleblowing by giving financial incentives to whistleblowers.  
See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial 
Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 278-82 (1992) 
(listing examples of various rewards to whistleblowers provided by federal and state 
statutes).  The Bounty Model, however, is not extensively applied to encourage the 
reporting of fraud against corporations themselves (as opposed to fraud against the 
government) and, unlike the two models discussed in this Article, was not implemented 
in response to the corporate scandals.  Accordingly, although it is an intriguing idea that 
deserves further study, applying the Bounty Model to prevent fraud against 
corporations is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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after the employee discloses wrongdoing.6 The second approach, 
which I label the Structural Model, requires that corporations 
provide employees with a standardized channel to report 
organizational misconduct internally within the corporation.7
While academic and public attention has focused almost 
exclusively on Sarbanes-Oxley’s version of the Anti-retaliation 
Model,8 this Article is the first comprehensive academic work to 
analyze the ability of Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to 
engage corporate employees in the battle to reduce corporate 
fraud.  Utilizing social science research analyzing whistleblower 
motivations, I conclude that the Structural Model may produce 
more effective disclosures from whistleblowing employees than 
prior attempts to encourage whistleblowing, because the model 
addresses two significant problems that previously kept 
employees from consistently functioning as successful corporate 
monitors.   
In Part II of the Article, I use specific examples from the recent 
corporate scandals to illustrate these problems, both of which 
relate to the flow of employees’ inside knowledge of wrongdoing 
within a corporation.  First, during the scandals, employee 
information about wrongdoing did not flow readily.  Despite 
having inside knowledge about corporate misconduct, employees 
rarely spoke out about wrongdoing because of a compelling norm 
 
6 See MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 232 (1992); 
Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 5, at 273-78; Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry 
Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 100 
(2000). 
7 The structure of the channel can be fairly simple, such as designating an internal 
officer to receive such reports or setting up a “hotline” for employees to call.  
Organizations also might install more complex reporting systems, complete with 
ombudsmen who handle employee reports, ensure anonymity for the employees, 
investigate their concerns, and provide employees feedback on the outcome of the 
investigations.  See, e.g., Marlene Winfield, Whistleblowers as Corporate Safety Net, in 
WHISTLEBLOWING – SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP? 24 (1994) (describing 
ombudsmen system implemented by Otis Elevator Company); Alan R. Yuspeh, Sharing 
“Best Practices” Information, in GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 64. 
8 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. KOHN, ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER LAW (2004); Leonard M. 
Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: An Analysis of Corporate Whistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the 
Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 875 (2002); Miriam A. 
Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029 (2004); Robert G. Vaughn, 
America’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1 (2005); Ashlea Ebeling, Blowing the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistle, FORBES.COM (June 18, 
2003), available at http://www.forbes.com/2003/06/18/cx_ae_0618beltway_print.html.     
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of silence among employees.9 Second, on the rare occasion when 
employees spoke out, corporate executives typically blocked or 
filtered the information provided by employees before it reached 
traditional corporate monitors, such as the board of directors or 
the government.  The few “successful” whistleblowers overcame 
these two problems; thousands of other rank-and-file employees 
did not.   
In Part III of the Article, I describe the two approaches utilized 
by Sarbanes-Oxley to address these problems – the Anti-
retaliation Model and the Structural Model.  Here I conclude that 
the Anti-retaliation Model implemented by Sarbanes-Oxley is not 
sufficient to address these flow-of-information difficulties.  By 
contrast, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model offers significant 
improvements over versions of the Structural Model utilized prior 
to the corporate scandals.  First, the Act requires that corporate 
boards of public companies establish avenues (i.e., structures) for 
employees to report wrongdoing directly to the independent 
directors on the board’s audit committee – not to corporate 
executives.10 Second, Sarbanes-Oxley made the implementation 
of this disclosure channel mandatory.11 
In Part IV, I evaluate these improvements and suggest that 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model is more likely than the Anti-
retaliation Model to reduce the flow-of-information problems that 
contributed to the corporate scandals, because the model provides 
a direct and legitimate disclosure channel from employees to the 
board of directors.  This requirement should encourage more 
whistleblowing because it provides incentives to increase 
employee participation as corporate monitors and reduces various 
disincentives to employee whistleblowing.12 Equally important, 
this direct channel to the board should encourage effective 
whistleblowing by circumventing information blocking and 
filtering from corporate executives.13 In this way, Sarbanes-
Oxley’s Structural Model minimizes the principal-agent problem 
that arises when employees provide information about 
misconduct to mid-level managers and corporate executives who 
cover-up or ignore the fraud.  Furthermore, the model should 
 
9 See, e.g., Terance D. Miethe & Joyce Rothschild, Whistleblowing and the Control of 
Organization Misconduct, 64 SOC. INQUIRY 322, 332-37 (1994) (finding low levels of 
whistleblowing after discovery of misconduct); Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due 
Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 119-23 (1995). 
10 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(A) (Supp. 2002). 
11 See id. 
12 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
13 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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provide several secondary benefits to corporations and their 
employees, such as improving corporate decision-making, 
reducing monitoring costs, and increasing employee voice within 
the corporation.  Such benefits may lead to greater acceptance and 
implementation than pre-scandal attempts to encourage 
whistleblowers.14 
Although it is an improvement over prior approaches, 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model still suffers from significant 
flaws.  In Part V, I explain the inadequacies of Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
Structural Model and offer several suggestions for improvement.  
One problem is that the model may not work well enough: 
corporations may implement disclosure channels that appear 
sound on paper, but do not work in reality.15 This “cheating” 
problem can be addressed in several ways.  First, corporations 
could disclose information regarding their whistleblower system.  
For example, corporations could publicize the structure of their 
whistleblower disclosure model publicly in order to advise 
shareholders and employees of the extent of their system.  
Similarly, corporations could be required to disclose various 
metrics regarding the effectiveness of their disclosure channel, 
such as the number and type of complaints and the resolution of 
those complaints.  Through these disclosures, shareholders, 
employees, and government regulators could evaluate the 
effectiveness of a whistleblower disclosure system.  A second way 
to address the cheating problem is to provide corporations a true 
incentive to create effective whistleblower systems by permitting 
a limited safe harbor for corporations that implement verifiably 
effective whistleblower channels prior to any wrongdoing.  
The converse of the “cheating” problem presents another 
potential difficulty: the model may work too well.  Complaints 
from employees may overwhelm directors and prevent them from 
efficiently and sufficiently addressing the complaints, much less 
attend to their obligation to oversee the business of the 
company.16 Addressing this “noise” problem may require the 
SEC to promulgate regulations that reduce the burden on 
directors, while still requiring director oversight of the 
information obtained through a whistleblower disclosure channel.  
For example, the SEC may explicitly permit directors to outsource 
initial review of such disclosures to ethics officers or third-parties 
that report directly to the board rather than to corporate 
 
14 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
15 See discussion infra Part V.B. 
16 See discussion infra Part V.C. 
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executives.  Approving sufficient, but limited, whistleblower 
structures through regulation may prevent corporations from 
implementing inefficient and cumbersome systems in order to 
satisfy Sarbanes-Oxley’s vague mandate.   
Ultimately, the goal of the Structural Model should be to 
balance the need for employees to disclose important inside 
knowledge to independent directors with the need for directors to 
efficiently and effectively monitor all aspects of a corporation’s 
business.  Sarbanes-Oxley’s approach is a good start, but in its 
current form, it fails to provide frameworks that fully utilize 
employees’ ability to monitor corporations effectively. 
II. THE NEED TO ENCOURAGE MORE EFFECTIVE 
WHISTLEBLOWING 
A.  Information Problems and the Traditional Corporate Monitors 
Effective corporate monitoring benefits corporate 
shareholders and employees, as well as the general public.17 
Traditional monitoring occurs through a variety of overlapping 
means.  A board of directors monitors a corporation’s professional 
management on behalf of the shareholders, who are too dispersed 
and diverse to monitor management themselves.18 Professional 
corporate “gatekeepers,” such as auditors and attorneys, provide 
outside monitoring of corporations that protects shareholders as 
well as the investing public.19 Further, the government monitors 
companies through government inspectors and by requiring 
various corporate reports to be filed.20 
17 See Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christine J. Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics, 
and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 316 (2004); Reinier H. 
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 
863 (1984); Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 280-
85 (2004). 
18 See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Enron’s Tangled Web: Complex Relationships; 
Unanswered Questions, 71 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 1167, 1170-74 (2002-03); Troy A. Paredes, 
Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in 
ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 495, 498 & n.14 (Nancy B. Rapoport 
& Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) [hereinafter FIASCOS]; Ribstein, supra note 17, at 285. 
19 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308-10 (2004); Reinier H. Kraakman, 
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 
(1986). 
20 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (requiring public companies to make periodic filings 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission).  Government-like entities, such as 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model 
3/5/2006 Page 8 
 
A primary advantage of each of these traditional corporate 
monitors is that they are external to the company.  Directors who 
are independent purportedly provide dispassionate oversight of 
management.21 Gatekeepers have reputational concerns outside 
of their contractual relationship with corporations to inspire them 
to provide effective monitoring.22 When the government enforces 
laws and regulations, accountability to the public at large keeps 
regulators from being influenced by the corporation’s own goals. 
Despite the advantage of external monitors, however, such 
distance presents a significant challenge: monitoring the inner 
workings of a company from the outside.23 External monitors 
must rely upon information they receive from corporate 
executives in order to fulfill their monitoring function.24 Even 
under the best circumstances, this information is certain to be 
incomplete and self-serving due to information blocking and 
filtering by executives and subordinate managers.25 Under the 
 
various securities listing agencies like the New York Stock Exchange, also monitor 
corporations. 
21 Independent directors are a principal means by which to monitor corporate 
managers.  Their independence can enhance the objectivity of the board because 
independent directors are not as dependent on short-term corporate results to maintain 
their position with the corporation.  See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and 
Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 244-50 (1997);  Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better 
Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213, 
1237 n.100 (2000).  Moreover, they may be more willing to disclose wrongdoing 
publicly, because they can do so without losing their employment.  See Eisenberg, supra,
at 244-48; Kostant, supra at 1237 n.100. 
22 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 19, at 308; Kraakman, supra note 19, at 61 n.20, 94. 
23 See Kostant, supra note 21, at 1239.  For example, the independence of a director 
may only exacerbate the informational asymmetries that already exist.  Outside 
directors “devote but a small portion of their time and effort to the firm.”  Bainbridge & 
Johnson, supra note 17, at 310; see also Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils 
of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1250 (2003) (noting that directors have information 
gathering problems because they only meet a few times a year).  Therefore, they can 
have difficulty understanding the inner workings of the company they are charged with 
monitoring.  See Eliot Spitzer, Keynote Address, Symposium: Enron and Its Aftermath, 76 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 801, 807 (2002). 
24 See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner 
Circles, 83 OREGON L. REV. 435, 460 (2004); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, 
and Informational Monopolies, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1349-50 (2005). 
25 Information blocking and filtering occurs when information is withheld by 
subordinates, and “communication upward [is] highly filtered and correspondingly 
inaccurate.”  John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of 
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1144 (1977); 
Kostant, supra note 21, at 1239-40.  This blocking and filtering has numerous causes, 
including: (a) a shared feeling on the part of subordinate officials that they owe their 
loyalty chiefly to senior management and not to the board; (b) a belief that the board is 
interested only in “hard” quantitative information, such as capital costs, financial ratios, 
and expected rates of return; (c) a sense that “everybody knows anyway,” coupled with 
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worst circumstances, corporate executives may affirmatively hide 
and misrepresent information in order to evade a monitor’s 
oversight.  Thus, flow-of-information problems can arise because 
these traditional corporate monitors do not have enough 
information, and because they often have distorted and filtered 
information.     
These problems contributed to the failure of traditional 
monitors to detect the wrongdoing at the center of the recent 
corporate scandals.26 Certainly the greed of corporate executives 
triggered the massive fraud,27 and traditional corporate monitors 
should have been more active in their oversight responsibilities.28 
Other systemic issues also contributed to this unprecedented 
failure in corporate governance.29 There is sufficient blame to go 
around.30 Yet, as discussed below, one of the most glaring (yet 
 
the perception that the board would rather not be put on formal notice as to the ugly 
“facts of life” of doing business abroad; and (d) a “lack of congruence” between the 
interests of the corporation and the career aspirations of individual corporate officials.  
See Coffee, supra, at 1131; see also Linda Klebe Trevino, Out of Touch: The CEO’s Role in 
Corporate Misbehavior, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1195, 1209-10 (2005) (describing research 
regarding the distortion and filtering of information from subordinates to superiors in 
hierarchical organization). 
26 The failings of the traditional monitors in these scandals, particularly with 
regard to Enron, have been exhaustively detailed elsewhere.  See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 
19, at 313-15; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New 
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1125-43 (2002); John R. 
Kroger, Enron, Fraud and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s Perspective, 75 U. COLO.
L. REV. 57, 59-60 (2004). 
27 See Ribstein, supra note 17, at 280-81; Greg Ip, Greenspan Issues Hopeful Outlook as 
Stocks Sink, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2002, at A1 (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan in July 16, 2002 speech in which Mr. Greenspan blamed an “infectious 
greed“ for the corporate scandals); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate 
Thermostat: Lessons from Recent Financial Scandals about Self-Deception, Deceiving Others 
and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 286 (2004) (“Indeed, unrestrained 
greed has now become the standard trope in the social construction of these events.”). 
28 Fanto, supra note 24, at 435-36; O’Connor, supra note 23, at 1235-36; Powers 
Report, supra note 2, at 22, 148. 
29 Systemic explanations for the corporate scandals include: the perverse 
incentives provided by managerial stock options for corporate officers to inflate a 
corporation’s stock price, see Coffee, supra note 19, at 304; a “bubble atmosphere” fueled 
by new business techniques and a lack of investor skepticism, see Ribstein, supra note 17, 
at 281; the legislative undermining of private securities liability through, among other 
things, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995; see andré douglas pond 
cummings, “Ain’t No Glory in Pain”: How the 1994 Republican Revolution and the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act Contributed to the Collapse of the United States Capital 
Markets, 83 Neb. L. Rev. 979, 1044 (2005); and a judicial tightening of burdens of proof 
for demonstrating aiding and abetting liability in violation of federal securities law, see 
id. at 1023-24 & 1048 n.320 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994)). 
30 See Kroger, supra note 26, at 59-60; Paredes, supra note 18, at 503 (“Many things 
contributed to Enron’s demise.  There were breakdowns all around – accountants, 
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under-analyzed) facts regarding the scandals is that the 
information concerning the fraudulent conduct was available to 
rank-and-file employees for years.  This information, however, 
either never made it to the traditional corporate monitors or was 
so filtered that it did not inspire any of the monitors to end the 
misconduct until shareholders lost millions of dollars of value in 
their investments.31 
B.  Overcoming Information Problems - Employees as Corporate 
Monitors 
Corporate employees could be instrumental in solving these 
information problems.  Employees have an information 
advantage over traditional corporate monitors because they have 
more complete knowledge regarding the inner workings of a 
large corporation.32 Financial misconduct on the scale that 
occurred during the recent corporate scandals virtually requires 
the assistance of low and mid-level employees because of its scope 
 
lawyers, securities analysts, and credit rating agencies (the ‘gatekeepers’); the SEC, and 
the board of directors, not to mention the underlying corporate misconduct.  Even the 
‘victims’ – the investors – bear some responsibility for seemingly, perhaps 
understandably, becoming complacent after historic bull markets and failing to ask the 
tough questions of Enron’s management that should have been asked.”). 
31 To some extent, this problem is not new.  During corporate scandals in the 
1970s relating to corporate bribery of public officials, Professor Coffee noted significant 
problems with information flow to the board of directors.  See Coffee, supra note 25, at 
1127-28.  Corporate officers systematically kept information about the bribery from the 
board of directors, and the hierarchical structure of the corporation cut off subordinates 
who attempted to raise red flags.  See id. at 1133-34.  Writing in the early 1980’s, Alan 
Westin also lamented the harmful results that occurred when corporate management 
blocked information from employees regarding illegalities taking place within the 
corporation.  See Alan F. Westin, Introduction: Why Whistle Blowing Is on the Rise, in 
WHISTLE-BLOWING: LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 1, 10-12 (Alan Westin ed., 
1981) [hereinafter Westin, Introduction]. 
32 Although the statement that employees have better information about corporate 
conduct than outside monitors seems rationally based on common sense, Ralph Nader 
put it nicely in his early work on corporate whistleblowers: 
Corporate employees are among the first to know about industrial 
dumping of mercury or fluoride sludge into waterways, defectively 
designed automobiles, or undisclosed adverse effects of prescription 
drugs and pesticides.  They are the first to grasp the technical capabilities 
to prevent existing product or pollution hazards.  But they are very often 
the last to speak out, much less to refuse to be recruited for acts of 
corporate or governmental negligence or predation. 
Ralph Nader, An Anatomy of Whistle Blowing, in WHISTLE BLOWING: THE REPORT OF THE 
CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 4 (Ralph Nader et al. eds., 1972).  
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and complexity.33 Additionally, even if an employee does not 
participate in the wrongdoing, corporate accounting and finance 
employees who are trained in the proper methods of conducting 
business should recognize when corporate actions fall outside 
legal boundaries.34 In fact, even with few corporate or legal 
incentives provided to whistleblowing employees, roughly one-
third of frauds and other economic crimes against businesses are 
reported by whistleblowers.35 Thus, given their central role in 
corporate activity, information from rank-and-file employees is 
essential to uncovering wrongdoing in a timely way.  
Accordingly, effectively encouraging rank-and-file employees to 
disclose their knowledge of wrongdoing is a critical step in 
discovering fraud and other corporate misconduct.    
1.  The Few Who Succeeded 
Unlike the traditional corporate monitors during the recent 
scandals, some corporate employees successfully identified and 
reported the corporate fraud, particularly at WorldCom, Kmart, 
and several mutual funds companies.  These whistleblowing 
employees succeeded for two reasons.  First and foremost, they 
simply spoke out and disclosed their inside knowledge regarding 
misconduct occurring inside their corporation.  Second, the 
successful whistleblowing employees spoke out effectively by 
disclosing their information directly to traditional corporate 
monitors rather than to corporate executives. 
The most famous example of a successful individual 
employee whistleblower may be Cynthia Cooper, who was the 
head of internal auditing at WorldCom.36 Cooper uncovered 
manifold illegal accounting practices at WorldCom in 2002 and 
reported the illegalities directly to WorldCom’s Board of 
Directors.  The Board publicly admitted the financial 
manipulations and fired WorldCom’s CFO Scott Sullivan, who 
allegedly orchestrated the fraud and tried to stop Cooper’s 
 
33 See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 374 (2003); Ribstein, supra note 17, at 286. 
34 Richard Alexander, The Role of Whistleblowers in the Fight Against Economic Crime,
12 J. FIN. CRIME 131, 131 (2004). 
35 See Brickey, supra note 33, at 365 n.37 (citing study reported in Jonathan D. 
Glater, Survey Finds Fraud’s Reach in Big Business, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2003, at C3). 
36 See Amanda Ripley, The Night Detective, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 45, 46-47. 
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investigation.37 By reporting Sullivan’s misconduct directly to the 
Board, Cooper successfully avoided his attempt to block 
disclosure of the fraud.38 
Other whistleblowers similarly were effective because they 
disclosed information directly to the government, another 
traditional corporate monitor.39 For example, separate, 
anonymous whistleblowers uncovered fraud at Symbol 
Technologies and Kmart when they sent letters to government 
regulators.40 More recently, the mutual fund industry paid 
hundreds of millions of dollars to settle charges arising out of 
allegations made by employee whistleblowers to government 
investigators regarding improper practices in the industry.41 
37 See id. at 49. WorldCom ultimately filed for the largest bankruptcy in American 
history.  See Ken Belson, WorldCom’s Audacious Failure and Its Toll on an Industry, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at C1. 
38 Ethics hotlines also helped whistleblowers succeed.  At Duke Power, a call from 
an employee whistleblower to the company’s ethics hotline in July 2001 led to the 
company’s payment of a $25 million fee to state regulators.  See Melissa Davis, Enron 
Aside, Whistle-Blowers Still Withering, THE STREET.COM, at http://www.thestreet.com/ 
stocks/melissadavid/10090120.html (May 29, 2003).   
39 To be sure, some whistleblowers also were successful because they disclosed 
information directly to the public, either through the media or an individual lawsuit.  
For example, a former Dynegy employee gave papers about “Project Alpha” – a 
financial vehicle implemented by Dynegy to exaggerate cash flow and reduce taxes – to 
the Wall Street Journal, which led to an SEC civil securities-fraud case that the company 
settled for $3 million, a shareholder lawsuit, and resignations of senior executives.  See 
Jathon Sapsford & Paul Beckett, Whistle-Blower Reels from Actions’ Fallout, WALL ST. J. 
ONLINE, at http://www.careerjournaleurope.com/myc/survive/20021217sapsford.html 
(Dec. 17, 2002).  Also, after receiving allegations in a whistleblower lawsuit about 
marketing fraud related to its relationship to Burger King, The Coca-Cola Company 
conducted an internal investigation and ultimately offered to pay Burger King $21 
million to compensate for the frauds.  See Alix Nyberg, Whistle-Blower Woes, CFO, Oct. 
2001, at 51, 52. 
40 In April 2001, an anonymous whistleblower sent a letter to the S.E.C. alleging 
that Symbol Technologies engaged in improper accounting.  After three years of 
government and internal investigations, Symbol restated earnings for five years and the 
government indicted seven former senior executives for accounting fraud.  See Steve 
Lohr, Ex-Executives at Symbol are Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2004, at C1.  In its 
restatements, Symbol reduced revenue by $234 million and net income by $325 million.  
See id. Symbol also settled investor and S.E.C. lawsuits for $138 million.  See id. In 
January 2001, an anonymous whistleblower sent a letter about corporate wrongdoing to 
Kmart’s board and to government officials that resulted in at least two criminal 
indictments, allegedly based upon improperly recording payments to overstate Kmart’s 
earnings.  See Constance L. Hays, 2 Ex-Officials at Kmart Face Fraud Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2003, at C1. 
41 See Jayne O’Donnell, The Guy Who Blew the Whistle on Putnam, USA TODAY, at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/funds/2003-11-20-whistleblower-1a-cover_x. 
htm (Nov. 20, 2003).  Putnam Investments alone paid nearly $194 million to settle claims 
that investors were hurt by the practice of market timing. See Jon Chesto, Mass. Market: 
Whistle-blower Law Needs Updating; No One Rewarded in 5-Year History, PATRIOT LEDGER, at 
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These whistleblowing employees themselves could not stop 
misconduct, but by providing information directly to traditional 
monitors, the employees circumvented the barriers corporate 
executives erected to shield external monitors from the 
misconduct. 
2.  The Many Who Failed 
The success of these few individual whistleblowers, however, 
highlights the overall failure of corporate employees to identify 
and successfully report the wrongdoing occurring in these 
companies and others, such as Enron.  Two primary failures 
occurred – failures that were the inverse of the successes 
discussed above. 
a.  Failing to Speak Out 
First, unlike the few successful individual whistleblowers, the 
vast majority of knowledgeable employees failed to reveal 
wrongdoing because they were unable or unwilling to speak out.  
The misconduct at many of the corporations affected by the 
scandals occurred over a period of several years.42 During this 
time, rank-and-file employees certainly participated, at some 
level, in the improper practices that led to the fraud.43 For 
 
http://ledger.southofboston.com/articles/2005/07/09/news/news06.txt (July 9, 2005); 
Meet a Major-League Whistleblower, CBSNEWS.COM, at http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2004/07/07/60II/printable628000.shtml (July 7, 2004). 
42 For example, the fraud at Enron was ongoing for at least four years before the 
company filed for bankruptcy in December 2001.  See Powers Report, supra note 2, at 2, 32.  
The amounts involved in the restatement are staggering.  As set forth in the Powers 
Report, the restatement: 
reduced Enron’s reported net income by $28 million in 1997 (of $105 
million total), by $133 million in 1998 (of $703 million total), by $248 
million in 1999 (of $893 million total), and by $99 million in 2000 (of $979 
million total).  The restatement reduced reported shareholders’ equity by 
$258 million in 1997, by $391 million in 1998, by $710 million in 1999, and 
by $754 million in 2000.  It increased reported debt by $711 million in 
1997, by $561 million in 1998, by $685 million in 1999, and by $628 million 
in 2000. 
Id. at 3. The HealthSouth fraud may have lasted as long as fifteen years, see Kurt 
Eichenwald, Key Executive at HealthSouth Admits to Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at 
C1, and “ranks as one of the biggest, and perhaps the most blatant, in corporate 
history.”  See Melissa Davis, HealthSouth Spotlight Turns to Ex-Auditor, THESTREET.COM, at 
http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/melissadavid/10089204.html (May 22, 2003). 
43 At Enron, for example, the misrepresentations and the improper accounting 
practices that led to Enron’s bankruptcy were long-standing and well-known 
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example, when corporate executives at Enron made outlandish 
profit predictions, employees knew they must “gin [up]” earnings 
and revenues to match the predictions.44 Thus, executives may 
have hatched accounting scams, but often their underlings were 
sent to do the dirty work of executing the plan, despite the 
underlings’ knowledge that such accounting was illegal.45 
Furthermore, even if employees did not directly participate in 
the fraud, employees often knew that something in the 
corporation was amiss.  At Enron, for example, knowledge about 
the company’s earnings manipulation was so widespread that 
employees joked about it at company parties.46 For months prior 
to Enron’s bankruptcy filing, numerous employees knew that 
executives’ public statements about Enron’s financial strength 
were not true and that the company’s business was failing.47 
However, despite their lengthy exposure to flawed financial 
practices and public misrepresentations, few employees came 
forward to complain.48 Importantly, this phenomenon was not 
unique to Enron: the majority of employees who witnessed 
wrongdoing did not report it.49 Successful whistleblowers, by 
definition, overcame this inherent hesitation to speak out. 
 
throughout the company.  See, e.g., MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 116; 182-83 
(giving examples of employee knowledge of Enron’s practice of inflating sales 
numbers); 219-20; 230; 269-70 (discussing wide-spread employee knowledge and 
participation in various strategies to manipulate California’s energy market); 303-04; 
332. 
44 See id. at 289. 
45 See Davis, supra note 42 (noting that the CFO of HealthSouth admitted to 
directing the company’s auditing staff to inflate the company’s earnings.); Kenneth N. 
Gilpin, Ex-Rite Aid Officials Face U.S. Charges of Financial Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2002, 
at A1 (noting that the indictment of the CFO for Rite Aid alleged that he coordinated the 
accounting fraud by “instructing less-senior employees in the accounting department to 
make unsupported entries in the company’s books and records that did not meet 
generally accepted accounting principles”). 
46 See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 296. 
47 See, e.g., ROBERT BRYCE, PIPE DREAMS: GREED, EGO, AND THE DEATH OF ENRON 246-
47 (2002); MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 230; 303; 332. 
48 There are exceptions, of course.  In March 2001, one Enron employee sent an 
anonymous letter to Fortune magazine to complain that company executives were 
understating the extent of recent job cuts.  See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 332. 
49 Several studies have found low reporting rates among employees who witness 
misconduct.  See, e.g., MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 96-99; TERANCE D. MIETHE,
WHISTLEBLOWING AT WORK: TOUGH CHOICES IN EXPOSING FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE ON 
THE JOB 31 (1999); Estlund, supra note 9, at 119-20; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 
332-33 (surveying 6 studies of whistleblowing and finding that the average rate of 
whistleblowing is 42%). 
To Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers 
3/5/2006   Page 15  
 
b.  Executive Blocking and Filtering 
A second flow-of-information failure occurred because, even 
if employees spoke out, their disclosures of wrongdoing often 
were ineffective.  Rather than report misconduct to traditional 
corporate monitors, failed whistleblowers disclosed information 
to corporate executives, who subsequently prevented it from 
reaching official monitors.  Executives either blocked the 
information entirely or filtered the information before it reached 
the traditional monitors to avoid alerting the monitors to the 
misconduct.50 These problems were apparent at many of the 
companies involved in the corporate fraud;51 however, the fraud 
at Enron presents the clearest, and most well documented,52 
examples. 
At the core of the Enron fraud were “massive accounting 
fraud and irregularities, a principal feature of which was the use 
of structured finance techniques designed to get debt off Enron’s 
balance sheet and inflate Enron’s profits.”53 During the course of 
this fraud, Enron executives successfully blocked many employee 
complaints regarding improper or illegal business tactics by 
responding to any complaint with hostility and obfuscation.54 
50 See Mitchell, supra note 24, at 1313-14. 
51 For example, in August 2001, a Global Crossing vice president for finance wrote 
the company’s Chief Ethics Officer claiming that the company was engaging in 
improper accounting techniques.  See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED 362-63 (2003).  
The top executives at the company never sent this letter to its Board or its auditors.  See 
id. at 363. 
52 See Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 
U. PENN. L. REV. 1517, 1518 n.4 (2004) (listing the “staggering amount of scholarship on 
Enron”); Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Nancy B. Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Skilling: How Enron’s 
Public Image Morphed from the Most Innovative Company in the Fortune 500 to the Most 
Notorious Company Ever, in FIASCOS, supra note 18, at 77, 87 (noting that since Enron’s 
bankruptcy filing, Enron books “have become their own cottage industry”); id. at 87 n.36 
(listing dozens of books published about Enron); see generally Powers Report, supra note 2 
(investigative report by special committee of the Enron Board of Directors). 
53 Paredes, supra note 18, at 503. 
54 See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 135; 149-50; 294; MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 
308-09; Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and The Perfect Storm, in CORPORATE FIASCOS,
supra note 18, at 927, 937 (“Those who objected often found themselves the subject of 
pressure, downright abuse, and exile.”); Tim Mcguire, More Than Work: Many Yelled 
‘Fire!’ at Enron, But Deceit Drowned Them Out, WINSTON-SALEM J., Aug. 21, 2005, available 
at http://www.journalnow.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=WSJ/MGArticle/ 
WSJ_BasicArticle&c=MGArticle&cid=10311784558108 (“That was a clear pattern at 
Enron: If anyone suggested wrongdoing, they were considered a hindrance and 
ousted.”).  From the earliest studies of whistleblowers, researchers have described 
anecdotal evidence of management hostility to underlings who report wrongdoing as 
typical of reactions to whistleblowers.  See, e.g., Alan F. Westin, Conclusion: What Can and 
Should Be Done to Protect Whistle Blowers in Industry, in WHISTLE-BLOWING: LOYALTY AND 
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From the company’s earliest days, Enron executives silenced and 
undermined employees who raised concerns about Enron’s 
accounting and financial practices.55 This information blocking 
grew increasingly problematic by the late 1990s, when employees 
repeatedly complained to Enron’s risk assessment group and 
corporate executives about the off-balance sheet “special purpose 
entities” that became the center of the Enron scandal.56 These 
complaints never made it to the Board of Directors, which, on 
three separate occasions, waived Enron’s Code of Ethics and 
approved the conflicts of interests these entities created.57 Enron’s 
Board never substantively investigated the propriety or long-term 
impact of these entities.58 Furthermore, in early 2001, as Enron’s 
businesses began to show signs of strain, a few employees 
reported to corporate executives that large losses were being 
hidden.59 Executives disregarded these reports and never 
completed internal investigations.60 At least one employee wrote 
a signed letter to Enron’s management and the Secretary of the 
Board in which she detailed the misrepresentations about Enron’s 
earnings.61 The letter, however, was never shown to Enron’s 
Board of Directors.62 
Even if employees avoided management’s information 
blocking, corporate executives often filtered and slanted employee 
 
DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 131, 132 (Alan Westin ed., 1981) [hereinafter Westin, 
Conclusion]; Westin, Introduction, supra note 31, at 10-12. 
55 See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 38-42 (describing actions by Ken Lay in late 1980’s to 
cover up internal reports regarding falsified bank statements and illegal payments to 
corporate officers); MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 94-95 (describing 1994 complaints 
by Jim Alexander regarding internal accounting issues). 
56 See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 160; 226; 231; MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 192-
93; 308-09; Powers Report, supra note 2, at 166-67 (describing complaints by Jeff McMahon 
to Jeffrey Skilling, Enron’s President and COO, regarding the failure of controls to 
protect Enron from Andrew Fastow’s conflict of interest in created the special purpose 
entities). 
57 See Paredes, supra note 18, at 503; Powers Report, supra note 2, at 148-65.  As 
Professor Paredes noted, by utilizing these special purpose entities that he individually 
controlled, Enron’s CFO, Andrew Fastow, “stood to make millions by, essentially, 
negotiating against Enron.”  Paredes, supra note 18, at 503.  The Board hardly discussed 
this massive conflict of interest or how to monitor it.  See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 
3, at 193.  There is no indication that internal employee concerns with the arrangements 
ever reached the Board.  See id. 
58 See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 164-65; 228-29. 
59 MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 298-304 (describing internal investigation of 
Enron Energy Services by Wanda Curry, an Enron accountant, which uncovered 
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of “unacknowledged, speculative trading losses”). 
60 Id. 
61 See id. at 358-59. 
62 See id. at 359. 
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information towards executives’ goals before the information 
reached the traditional corporate monitors.  For example, Sherron 
Watkins, the famed Enron whistleblower,63 actually was 
unsuccessful in stopping Enron’s fraud because the information 
she disclosed about misconduct at Enron was sanitized before it 
reached the Board of Directors.  Watkins’ error was that she 
complained to Enron’s CEO, Kenneth Lay, rather than to the full 
Board of Directors.64 Lay subsequently hired the law firm of 
Vinson & Elkins to investigate the allegations – the very same law 
firm that approved many of the transactions about which Watkins 
complained.65 When the Board ultimately learned of Watkins’ 
allegations, the report was whitewashed by Vinson & Elkins’ 
conclusion that the transactions Watkins reported were proper.66 
Thus, by hand-picking his friends at Vinson & Elkins to 
investigate Watkins’ claims, Lay successfully filtered Watkins’ full 
allegations from reaching the Board and the public, at least 
temporarily.67 Although Watkins certainly deserves credit for 
 
63 Watkins was named, along Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom, as one of Time 
Magazine’s People of the Year in 2002.  See Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of 
the Year, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 32, 32-33. 
64 In August 2001, Watkins reported her concerns regarding the accounting 
problems to Lay, first in an anonymous letter and subsequently in a meeting with Lay.  
See Cherry, supra note 8, at 1036 & 1036 n.31; Leslie Griffin, Whistleblowing in the Business 
World, in FIASCOS, supra note 18, at 209, 210-11.  Watkins presciently warned of her 
concern that Enron might “implode in a wave of accounting scandals.”  Memorandum 
from Sherron Watkins to Kenneth Lay, Aug. 15, 2001, available at 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/02142002Hearing489/tab10.pdf.  For 
a more lengthy description of Watkins’ role, see BRYCE, supra note 47, at 293-99, and 
MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 354-58. 
65 See Griffin, supra note 64, at 213-14; Powers Report, supra note 2, at 173.  Lay 
justified this choice by concluding that the investigation would only be “preliminary” 
and could be conducted most quickly by V&E because the law firm was “familiar” with 
Enron.  See Powers Report, supra note 2, at 173.  However, as noted by Enron’s own 
Board-led investigation after the bankruptcy filing, “[t]he result of the V&E review was 
largely predetermined by the scope and nature of the investigation and the process 
employed.”  See id. at 176. 
66 See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 366; Powers Report, supra note 2, at 175.  
At the Board meeting, a Vinson & Elkins attorney “assured the audit committee that [the 
Watkins letter] wasn’t a problem; his preliminary investigation had already concluded 
there was no need to look any further.  No Enron director asked to see Watkins’s letter . . 
. and there was no specific discussion of her concerns about the [special purpose 
entities].”  MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 366. 
67 Ultimately, of course, Watkins unveiled much of Enron’s “fuzzy” accounting to 
the government during her testimony to Congress in February 2002.  See The Financial 
Collapse of Enron: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House 
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 17 (2002) (Testimony of Sherron Watkins).  
However, these public disclosures occurred only after Enron filed for bankruptcy in 
December 2001 and Congress discovered her initial memo to Lay.  See Powers Report,
supra note 2, at 32. 
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being willing to step forward and report her concerns to Enron’s 
CEO, ultimately she was not effective as a whistleblower because 
she provided information to Enron’s executives rather than 
directly to Enron’s Board.68 
Finally, any conceivably problematic information that did 
make it to Enron’s traditional monitors often was discounted or 
ignored based upon the close relationship between the monitors 
and Enron executives.  Enron’s Board, although ideally 
independent on paper,69 never effectively questioned Enron’s 
management regarding its financial practices.70 Moreover, 
“gatekeepers,” such as Enron’s outside accountants and attorneys 
who received huge amounts of fees from Enron, did not raise red 
flags to anyone on Enron’s Board even though they knew that 
Enron’s aggressive accounting techniques were problematic.71 
The close relationships between purportedly independent 
monitors and Enron’s executives led to “group think” that 
prevented them from dispassionately fulfilling their 
responsibilities and questioning what they were being told.72 Had 
these monitors received unfiltered information from employees, 
however, they might have been forced to fulfill their oversight 
responsibilities in spite of their close relationship with Enron’s 
management.  
 
68 Despite the public accolades she received, Watkins ineffectiveness as a 
whistleblower has been criticized.  In his well-regarded book regarding the collapse of 
Enron, Robert Bryce entitled his chapter on Watkins “Sherron Watkins Saves Her Own 
Ass.”  See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 293; see also Griffin, supra note 64, at 220-21; Dan 
Ackman, Whistleblower?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2002, at A10. 
69 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the 
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2002); 
Peter C. Kostant, Sarbanes-Oxley and Changing the Norms of Corporate Lawyering, 2004 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 542 (2004). 
70 See Kostant, supra note 69, at 542. 
71 See BRYCE, supra note 47, at 298; Powers Report, supra note 2, at 17, 24-26; see also 
Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 17, at 301 (“All too often, lawyers acted as facilitators 
and enablers of management impropriety.”); Coffee, supra note 19, at 313-15 (discussing 
accountants’ role); Gordon, supra note 69, at 1237 (same); Gordon, supra note 26, at 1138 
(noting that lawyers had “the capacity to create endless shells under which to hide and 
move the peas”); Developments in the Law – Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2227, 2227 (2004) (“Lawyers’ negligence almost certainly contributed to the wave of 
corporate scandals that shook the securities markets in 2001 and 2002.”). 
72 See Fanto, supra note 24, at 441-42, 446-49; O’Connor, supra note 23, at 1257-93.  
“Group think” involves a “culture of silence” in which corporate leaders discourage 
critical discussions and influence from individuals outside of the corporate “inner 
circle.”  Fanto, supra note 24, at 469; see also O’Connor, supra note 23, at 1242-55 
(asserting that whatever information is received by directors often is analyzed in the 
context of norms of building board cohesiveness that make it difficult to test and 
question what is being told to them). 
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Most commentators ignored corporate employees’ role in 
these scandals and, instead, blamed the failures of the traditional 
corporate monitors for the success of the deceptions.73 In part, 
this blame is well deserved: the duties of traditional corporate 
monitors to investigate potential misconduct are more 
pronounced and formalized, and their authority to intervene is 
more apparent, than the duties and authority of rank-and-file 
employees.  However, thousands of employees, participated in, 
knew about, or willfully ignored the massive misconduct 
occurring within their companies.74 As important, even if 
employees were not direct participants, they certainly knew 
information that could have been useful to corporate monitors, 
perhaps leading to earlier discovery of the fraud.  To resolve the 
information problems raised by the corporate scandals, the 
potential of corporate employees to assist in corporate monitoring 
should not be ignored.  Part of the response to the corporate 
scandals should be to encourage more employees to become 
whistleblowers and also to encourage more effective 
whistleblowing by assisting employees in avoiding the problem of 
blocking and filtering of information by corporate executives.  The 
remainder of this Article examines whether the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act imposes the best means of implementing these goals.  
III. TWO WHISTLEBLOWER MODELS 
Versions of both the Anti-retaliation Model and the Structural 
Model existed before and during the corporate scandals, yet 
neither encouraged employees to disclose information about 
corporate fraud consistently and effectively.  In 2002, Congress 
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to address many of the corporate 
governance inadequacies brought to light in the wake of the 
 
73 See, e.g., Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 17, at 301 (blaming attorneys); Fanto, 
supra note 24, at 435-36 (corporate directors); Coffee, supra note 19, at 313-15 (outside 
auditors). 
74 See, e.g., Neal E. Boudette & Joann S. Lublin, Delphi Discloses New Irregularities in 
Its Accounting, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2005, at A3 (noting that although Delphi Corp.’s 
treasury staff “was aware of the [undisclosed] off-balance sheet debt,” no one reported it 
to the company’s CEO, the board of directors, or credit-rating agencies).  After the 
scandals, recovering corporations realized the danger of having employees who remain 
silent in the face of financial misconduct.  New management at both WorldCom (now 
known as MCI) and Tyco fired employees and executives who likely knew about 
financial improprieties.  See Joseph McCafferty, Adelphia Comes Clean, CFO MAGAZINE,
available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3011051/1/c_3036074?f=insidecfo (Dec. 1, 
2003).  
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corporate scandals.  As part of this legislation, Congress 
implemented versions of both models.75 
A.  Insufficiency of the Anti-retaliation Model 
The anti-retaliation provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act76 was 
widely praised by academics, who called it the “gold standard” of 
whistleblower protection77 and “the most important 
whistleblower protection law in the world.”78 For the first time, 
millions of employees would be protected by a national statute 
against retaliation.79 
The Act provides a broad definition of retaliation.  Employers 
may not “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any 
other manner discriminate” against whistleblowers.80 
The Act also provides extensive remedies.  Discharged 
employees may be reinstated and may receive compensatory 
special damages, including litigation costs and attorneys’ fees.81 
Furthermore, individuals may be criminally prosecuted for 
 
75 The other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley alter corporate governance on many 
fronts.  Among other things, the Act established a Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board to govern accounting firms, established rules regarding auditor and 
director independence, enhanced the requirements for financial disclosures, increased 
criminal penalties for certain white-collar crimes, and altered responsibilities for various 
corporate players, such as audit committees, corporate attorneys, corporate officers, and 
securities analysts.  See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 
745 (codified in scattered sections of the United States Code). 
76 The anti-retaliation provision is part of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud 
Accountability Act of 2002, which is Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  See id. § 806 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A).  Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation provisions have been 
thoroughly described and analyzed in other places.  See generally KOHN, supra note 8, at 
59-118 (analyzing legal requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation provision); 
Vaughn, supra note 8, at 8-99 (same).  Accordingly, I will only briefly outline its 
provisions here. 
77 See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUMBIA L. REV. 319, 376 (2005). 
78 Vaughn, supra note 8, at 105; see also KOHN, supra note 8, at xii (stating that the 
whistleblower provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are “the most systematic whistleblower 
protection framework enacted into federal law”).  But see Cherry, supra note 8, at 1034 
(concluding that Sarbanes-Oxley is a “half-measure” and not the true reform that 
securities law needs to respond to corporate fraud). 
79 See Vaughn, supra note 8, at 3. 
80 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). 
81 See id. § 1514A(c); see also KOHN, supra note 8, at 111 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley 
is one of only four federal statutes that permit recovery of attorney fees as part of 
“special damages” that must be awarded); Vaughn, supra note 8, at 94 n.400 (noting 
benefits of reinstatement as a remedy). 
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retaliating against whistleblowers, which seemingly would 
further deter potential retaliation.82 
Unlike under many federal anti-retaliation statutes, 
employees may bring private causes of action in federal district 
court if they are subject to retaliation.  Although an employee’s 
claim must first be brought to the Department of Labor 
(specifically, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
or OSHA), a court claim may be brought if the administrative 
process is not completed within 180 days,83 which it almost 
certainly will not be.84 
Yet, Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation provision suffers from 
significant defects.  The Act protects only employees of public 
corporations and only if they report violations of federal securities 
laws.85 Its statute of limitations period of ninety days is 
unreasonably short.86 Further, the remedies do not include any 
sort of punitive or liquidated damages to provide extra 
encouragement for employee whistleblowers.87 Finally, jumping 
through the administrative hoops of OSHA before being able to 
bring a claim in federal district court88 can be “cumbersome rather 
 
82 See 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (providing for fines and/or imprisonment of up to 10 
years for retaliating against a person for providing a law enforcement officer with 
truthful information relating to commission of a federal crime). 
83 See id. § 1514A(b).  Sarbanes-Oxley assigned responsibility for whistleblower 
investigations to the Department of Labor.  The Department of Labor subsequently 
assigned the responsibility to OSHA, which also conducts whistleblower investigations 
under several other federal statutes. 
84 See Allen v. Stewart Enterp., Final Decision and Order Dismissing Appeal, ARB 
Case No. 05-059 (Aug. 17, 2005), at 3 n.5 (noting that complainants dismissed their 
appeal in order to file in federal district court and stating that “[a]s is the usual case, the 
180-day period for deciding the case had expired before the Complainants filed their 
petition with the Board”); Vaughn, supra note 8, at 88.  The complete administrative 
process includes an initial OSHA investigation, review by an Administrative Law Judge, 
and final review by the Administrative Review Board of the Department of Labor.  29 
C.F.R. §§ 1980.104, .107, .110 (2005).  Given the current caseload for OSHA, the initial 
investigation alone can take almost 180 days.  The average time between the filing of a 
Sarbanes-Oxley complaint with OSHA and the issuance of a report by the OSHA 
investigator was 130 days for Fiscal Year 2005.  See Email from Nilgun Tolek, OSHA 
Office of Investigative Assistance, to Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. 
College of Law (Feb. 15, 2006) (on file with author).  This time period has grown 
significantly longer since the enactment of OSHA: in Fiscal Year 2003, the average length 
of a Sarbanes-Oxley investigation was 92 days.  See id. 
85 See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a). 
86 See id. § 1514A(b)(2)(D). 
87 See id. § 1514A(c). 
88 See id. § 1514A(b); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1980.101,.103, .104 (2005). 
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than expeditious, biased rather than expert, [and] ineffective 
rather than efficient.”89 
These statutory restrictions likely contribute to the low 
success rates of employees who bring claims under Sarbanes-
Oxley.  Of the 480 cases resolved at the initial investigative level 
by December 31, 2005, OSHA investigators found only 17 to have 
merit, while another 68 settled.90 The percentage of meritorious 
and settled cases for Sarbanes-Oxley is slightly lower than the 
percentage of successful claimants for other whistleblower 
statutes administered by OSHA,91 perhaps meaning that the 
“stronger” whistleblower protections of Sarbanes-Oxley are not 
resulting in more protections for whistleblowers.92 Moreover, of 
the 119 investigator decisions that were appealed by April 28, 
2005, the Department of Labor’s Administrative Law Judges 
(ALJs) decided in favor of employees only four times, while 
another nineteen settled.93 
Indeed, the decisions being issued by the ALJs are 
exacerbating Sarbanes-Oxley’s statutory shortcomings.  
Procedural issues eviscerate claimant’s cases.  Several decisions 
dismissed complaints because the wrong corporate entity was 
named94 or because a corporation filed a registration statement 
with the SEC, but withdrew it before it became effective, thus 
denying coverage under the Act.95 Claims have been dismissed 
for missing the ninety-day statute of limitations window,96 
89 Robert G. Vaughn, State of Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower 
Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581, 621 (1999). 
90 See Email from Nilgun Tolek, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to 
Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law (Feb. 15, 2006) (on file 
with author).   
91 See Email from Nilgun Tolek, OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to 
Richard Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law (July 11, 2005) (on file 
with author).  Interestingly, OSHA considers cases that have settled to be meritorious, 
and thus includes settled cases in its successful rate.  See id. 
92 Another contributing factor may be that employees are testing the outer 
boundaries of this new statute in the early years after its enactment.  After basic 
questions regarding jurisdiction and applicability are answered by Administrative Law 
Judges and the courts, it may be that the success rate increases. 
93 See Email from Todd Smyth, Office of Administrative Law Judges, to Richard 
Moberly, Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law (July 8, 2005) (on file with 
author). 
94 See, e.g., Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-11 
(Dep’t. of Labor July 6, 2004) (dismissing complaint for failure to name both publicly 
held parent company and its subsidiary).  
95 See Roulett v. Am. Capital Access, No. 2004-SOX-78 (Dep’t of Labor Dec. 22, 
2004). 
96 See, e.g., Lawrence v. AT&T Labs, No. 2004-SOX-65 (Dep’t of Labor Sept. 9, 
2004); Kingoff v. Maxim Group L.L.C., No. 2004-SOX-57 (Dep’t of Labor July 21, 2004). 
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including claims that missed the deadline by less than two 
weeks97 or because the date on which the limitations period began 
to run was the date the employer gave the employee two weeks’ 
notice rather than the date the whistleblower’s employment 
actually terminated.98 ALJs routinely reject equitable tolling of the 
statute of limitations.99 ALJs dismissed other claims because 
whistleblowers made complaints about the wrong topics, such as 
underpayment of employees,100 racial discrimination,101 or 
environmental violations,102 rather than securities fraud.   
These problems with Sarbanes-Oxley’s anti-retaliation 
provision reflect larger problems with the Anti-retaliation Model.  
First, anti-retaliation provisions in general do not provide realistic 
encouragement for employees to become corporate monitors, 
because they focus on protection only after a disclosure is made.103 
Surveys demonstrate that most employees are unaware of the 
protections they may (or may not) receive should they report 
wrongdoing.104 Moreover, even if an employee is aware that a 
disclosure might be protected, it is exceedingly difficult to 
determine the extent of any protection because there is little 
consistency among whistleblower statutes.105 Whether a 
whistleblower is protected depends upon the employee’s state of 
residence, the industry in which the employee works, the type of 
misconduct reported,106 the type of retaliation endured,107 and, for 
 
97 See Halpern v. XL Capital, Ltd., ARB Case No. 04-1120, ALJ Case No. 2004-SOX-
00054 (ARB Aug. 31, 2005); Hopkins v. ATK Tactical Sys., No. 2004-SOX-19 (Dep’t of 
Labor May 27, 2004). 
98 See Flood v. Cedant Corporation, 2004-SOX-16 (Dep’t of Labor Feb. 23, 2004). 
99 See Halpern, ARB Case No. 04-1120, ALJ Case No. 2004-SOX-54; Harvey v. 
Home Depot, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-20 (Dep’t of Labor May 28, 2004); Flood, ARB Case No. 
04-069, ALJ Case No. 2004-SOX-16. 
100 See Reddy v. Medquist, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-35 (Dep’t of Labor June 10, 2004). 
101 See Harvey, No. 2004-SOX-20. 
102 See Hopkins, No. 2004-SOX-19. 
103 See, e.g., C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
POWER 108-13 (2001); MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 66, 153-56; MIETHE, supra note 49, at 
133; Elletta Sangrey Callahan, et al., Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and U.S. Approaches 
to Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 879, 908-09 (2004); Terry Morehead 
Dworkin, Whistleblowing, MNC’s, Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 457, 474 (2002). 
104 See MIETHE, supra note 49, at 54. 
105 See 148 CONG. REC. S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) 
(“[C]orporate employees who report fraud are subject to the patchwork and vagaries of 
current state laws.”). 
106 States vary widely in the type of protections they provide.  See GA. CODE ANN.
§ 34-7-1 (2005); Goodroe v. Ga. Power Co., 251 S.E.2d 51, 52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978).  Others, 
like New Jersey, have a broad reaching statute protecting any whistleblower who 
reports any violation of law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19 (2005).  Federal law protects 
only whistleblowers who report certain types of violations in certain industries, and the 
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some laws, the willingness of administrative agencies to enforce 
the law.108 Sarbanes-Oxley only adds to this confusion.   
The second failure of the Anti-retaliation Model is that it does 
not address the flow-of-information problems revealed by the 
recent scandals.  Even if whistleblowing occurs and is protected, 
the model does not produce effective whistleblowing, because 
rarely do anti-retaliation laws indicate to whom an employee 
should make a disclosure.  Therefore, although an employee may 
be protected from retaliation by reporting to a supervisor or 
corporate executive, the actual corporate misconduct may not stop 
because the traditional corporate monitors may never receive the 
information.  As discussed above, in order for whistleblowers to 
act effectively as part of the corporate monitoring system, 
employees must be able to report misconduct to those with the 
authority and responsibility to end it rather than to a supervisor 
who might block or filter the information.  The Anti-retaliation 
Model simply does not address this issue. 
To be clear, anti-retaliation provisions are important from a 
fairness perspective because they provide ex post protections to 
people who should not be hurt for engaging in socially beneficial 
conduct.  Some surveys report that well over half of 
whistleblowers experience some sort of retaliation.109 Other 
researchers place the actual number much lower;110 nonetheless, 
the results of retaliation can be devastating.  Whistleblowing 
 
extent of the protection varies depending on the statute.  See, e.g., STEPHEN M. KOHN,
CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 79-80 (2001); MICELI & NEAR, supra 
note 6, at 233-34. 
107 Some laws protect employees only if they are discharged and do not address 
other forms of retaliation.  See, e.g., White v. State, 929 P.2d 396, 407 (Wash. 1997) 
(limiting retaliation suit to cases in which employee was actually or constructively 
discharged).  
108 See Estlund, supra note 9, at 122 n.92. 
109 See, e.g., Gerald Vinten, Whistleblowing – Fact or Fiction: An Introductory 
Discussion, in WHISTLEBLOWING – SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP? 3, 11 (Gerald 
Vinten ed., 1994) (citing study concluding that 86 of 87 whistleblowers experienced 
retaliation); ALFORD, supra note 103, at 18-19 (citing studies in which 1/2 to 2/3 of 
whistleblowers lose their jobs); Brickey, supra note 33, at 365 & 365 n.35 (citing non-
scientific survey of 200 whistleblowers by National Whistleblower Center finding that 
over ½ had lost their jobs and survey by Government Accountability Project that 90% of 
whistleblowers experienced retaliation or threats). 
110 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 203 (suggesting that generalizing about rate 
of retaliation is difficult because of variables in studies and citing study in which less 
than 20% of whistleblowers were retaliated against); Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet 
Near, A Better Statutory Approach to Whistleblowing, 7 BUS. ETHICS Q. 1, 5 (1997) (arguing 
that studies show that most whistleblowers do not suffer retaliation, even though most 
people think they do). 
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employees have been found dead or beaten.111 Whistleblowers 
often lose their jobs, and as a result, their marriages may be 
affected, they may lose their homes, and financial ruin might 
ensue.112 In short, the Anti-retaliation Model is necessary.  
However, it is not sufficient to address the flow-of-information 
problems that arose during the recent scandals. 
B.  Ineffectiveness of Pre-Scandal Versions of the Structural Model 
In contrast to the Anti-retaliation Model, the Structural Model 
focuses on encouraging and supporting whistleblowing before any 
disclosure is made.  The Structural Model is based on the 
understanding that whistleblowing becomes easier and more 
acceptable when corporations provide an authorized and visible 
channel for employees to report misconduct.113 Unlike the Anti-
retaliation Model, which, to be utilized at all, assumes an 
adversarial relationship between the employee whistleblower and 
the employer, the Structural Model encourages employees to 
become part of the corporate monitoring system, thus working in 
concert with the corporation rather than at odds with it.  The 
Structural Model encourages employees by signaling the extrinsic 
social and employment benefits of playing within the system and 
 
111 Although it has been difficult to connect such events to the employee’s 
whistleblowing activities, examples of atrocities inflicted upon whistleblowers abound, 
including the death of Karen Silkwood, see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 464 U.S. 238 
(1984), and more recently, the beating of an employee of Los Alamos National 
Laboratory shortly before he was to testify before Congress regarding alleged fraud at 
the lab, see Bradley Graham & Griff Witte, Whistle-Blower at Los Alamos Attacked in 
Parking Lot in N.M., at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/06/ AR2005060601787_pf.html (July 6, 2005), and the 
beating of one of the primary whistleblowers in the mutual fund scandal, see O’Donnell, 
supra note 41. 
112 See, e.g., Vinten, supra note 109, at 11; ALFORD, supra note 103, at 19-20.  Outside 
of these extremes, retaliation may take many forms, including “harassment, threats of 
termination, suspension, non-promotion, reassignment, transfer, denial of training, 
withholding wages or other benefits, closer supervision and scrutiny, or pestering.”  Ben 
Depoorter & Jef De Mot, Whistle Blowing, George Mason Law & Economics Research 
Paper No. 04-56, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=622723 (Nov. 15, 2004), at 24; see also 
ALFORD, supra note 103, at 31; Baynes, supra note 8, at 895.  Even former employees may 
face blacklisting from certain industries or from the job market in general.  See, e.g.,
Brickey, supra note 33, at 365; Depoorter & De Mot, supra, at 24 & 24 n.95; Miethe & 
Rothschild, supra note 9, at 326. 
113 Social science research demonstrates that whistleblowing increases when there 
is an identifiable, specific means for whistleblowing to occur.  See, e.g., Janet P. Near & 
Terry M. Dworkin, Responses to Legislative Changes: Corporate Whistleblowing Policies, 17 J. 
BUS. ETHICS 1551, 1557 (1998). 
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cooperating with the corporation.114 Rather than hoping that an 
employee’s report of wrongdoing makes its way through the 
managerial hierarchy to an individual with the authority to stop 
the misconduct, the Structural Model provides a visible 
mechanism for that report and instructs employees to utilize it.   
Despite its potential benefits, versions of the Structural Model 
in place in both the public and private sectors prior to the 
corporate scandals were ineffective.  In the public sphere, the 
federal government created a structure for whistleblowing 
employees to report misconduct in both the Inspector General Act 
of 1978 (IGA) and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA).115 
Under these provisions, Congress created offices charged with 
(among other things) receiving and investigating federal 
employee claims of wrongdoing in the government.116 The IGA 
required most federal agencies to create a position of Inspector 
General who received complaints from that agency’s 
employees.117 The CSRA more broadly provided an outlet for 
reports from any federal employee by creating the Office of 
Special Counsel (OSC).118 
The beginnings of the Structural Model can be seen best in the 
creation of the OSC.  The OSC receives whistleblower disclosures 
and informs the necessary federal agency about potential 
misconduct occurring within its ranks.119 By informing agencies 
of potential problems, Congress hoped that the OSC could 
become an “’early warning system’ for budding problems, serious 
enough to place agency leadership on notice and to require 
 
114 See discussion infra Part IV. 
115 See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–12 (2000); Civil Service 
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 111 (1978) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).  Both statutes also incorporated the Anti-retaliation 
Model by protecting federal employees who report any violations of law, rule, or 
regulation, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a 
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. app. § 7; 5 
U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 
116 See 5 U.S.C. app. § 2; 5 U.S.C. § 1206(b), subsequently repealed by Pub. L. 101-12 § 
3(a)(8), Apr. 10, 1989, 103 Stat. 21.  As part of both Acts, federal employees also 
purportedly were protected from retaliation for reporting such misconduct.  See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 2302(b)(8); 5 U.S.C. app. § 7. 
117 See id. § 2.   
118 See 5 U.S.C. § 1206(b)(3) (1988), subsequently repealed by Pub. L. 101-12, § 3(a)(8), 
Apr. 10, 1989, 103 Stat. 21. 
119 See id. § 1206(b)(2); see also Thomas M. Devine & Donald G. Aplin, Abuse of 
Authority: The Office of the Special Counsel and Whistleblower Protection, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 5, 52 
(1986). 
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acknowledgement.”120 If the OSC believed that a “substantial 
likelihood” existed that a whistleblower’s disclosure revealed 
potential wrongdoing covered by the statute, then the OSC could 
require the head of the agency to conduct an investigation and to 
submit a written report regarding the agency’s findings.121 The 
OSC would evaluate the report and determine whether the 
agency’s findings were reasonable and contained the appropriate 
information required by statute.122 Ultimately, the OSC submitted 
the agency reports to Congress and the President, and kept a 
public file of the report.123 Thus, the CSRA (and the IGA under 
similar provisions) went further than simply protecting 
whistleblowing employees from retaliation, although they 
theoretically did that as well.  Congress intended for these statutes 
to encourage potential whistleblowers by providing employees 
with an easy channel to report misconduct.124 
Prior to the corporate scandals, whistleblower disclosure 
channels were not imposed upon corporations in the private 
sector.  Rather, Congress and various courts gave incentives to 
organizations to create internal compliance systems, which often 
included implementing disclosure channels for employees to 
report corporate misconduct. 
In 1991, Congress approved the federal Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines (OSG), which utilized a “carrot and stick” 
approach125 to encourage organizations to implement an 
 
120 Devine & Aplin, supra note 119, at 19-20 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. H11822 (daily 
ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Schroeder)). 
121 See 5 U.S.C. § 1206(b)(3)(A) (1988), subsequently repealed by Pub. L. 101-12, 
§ 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 21 (Apr. 10, 1989). 
122 See id. In cases in which the OSC believed that the employee’s information 
about misconduct was reasonably supported, the agency’s report had to include a 
variety of information, including a summary of the investigation, a listing of any 
violation of law, rule, or regulation, and a description of any corrective action taken as a 
result of the investigation.  See id. § 1206(b). 
123 Id. § 1206(b)(5)(A).  If the agency failed to submit a timely report, the OSC was 
to notify Congress and the President of that failure as well.  See id. 
124 See Devine & Aplin, supra note 119, at 20 (“The purpose of the OSC 
whistleblowing disclosure channel was ‘to encourage employees to give the government 
the first crack at cleaning its own house before igniting the glare of publicity to force 
correction.’”) (footnote omitted). 
125 See Win Swenson, The Organizational Guidelines’ “Carrot and Stick” Philosophy, 
and Their Focus on “Effective” Compliance, in GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 28-29; see also 
Dworkin, supra note 103, at 464; Elletta Sangrey Callahan, et al., Integrating Trends in 
Whistleblowing and Corporate Governance: Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal 
Responsibility, and Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 190-91 (2002); Near & 
Dworkin, supra note 113, at 1557. 
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“effective program to prevent and detect violations of law.”126 
Under the OSG, penalties for corporations convicted of crimes 
could be reduced by up to 95% if the corporation previously 
implemented such a program; conversely, if no such program 
existed, then the potential fines were multiplied by up to 400 
percent.127 An “effective program” required that the organization 
exercise due diligence to prevent and to detect criminal conduct 
by its employees and agents.128 Such due diligence, in turn, 
required “having in place and publicizing a reporting system 
whereby employees and other agents could report criminal 
conduct by others within the organization without fear of 
retribution.”129 
The judiciary also gave incentives to corporations to monitor 
themselves more closely through structural disclosure channels.130 
In an influential opinion, Delaware’s Chancery Court opined that 
a director of a corporation has a duty to be reasonably informed 
about the corporation, a duty which includes implementing an 
adequate “corporate information and reporting system.”131 This 
holding encourages directors to initiate and maintain a disclosure 
channel for employees and agents to inform directors about 
problems within the corporation.132 In the sexual harassment 
context, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that employers who made 
reasonable efforts to deter and correct illegally harassing behavior 
may have an affirmative defense available to them against a 
sexual harassment plaintiff who has not been subject to a tangible 
employment action.133 Furthermore, in a different decision, the 
Court held that a corporation may be able to avoid punitive 
damages in a wrongful discharge case brought by a whistleblower 
if the corporation has an internal reporting mechanism available 
 
126 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL [hereinafter “OSG”] § 8A1.2 
(Commentary), Application Note 3(k) (1991).  The OSG were amended after the 
corporate scandals in November 2004.  See Organizational Guidelines and Compliance, 
at http://www.ussc.gov/orgguide.htm (last visited on July 11, 2005) (providing manual 
of federal sentencing guidelines and policy statements effective Nov. 1, 2004). 
127 See Paul Fiorelli, Will U.S. Sentencing Commission Amendments Encourage a New 
Ethical Culture Within Organizations?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565, 567 (2004). 
128 See OSG, supra note 126, § 8A1.2 (Commentary), Application Note 3(k).  
129 See id. Application Note 3(k)(5).    
130 See Callahan, et al., supra note 125, at 190; Susan Sturm, Second Generation 
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 480-84 (2001). 
131 See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, 970 (De. Ct. Chan. 1996).  Failure to set up 
such a corporate reporting structure may expose the director to breach of fiduciary 
charges if the lack of such a system caused a loss.  See id. 
132 See Dworkin, supra note 103, at 466. 
133 See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). 
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to report wrongdoing.134 These court decisions all encourage 
corporations to establish whistleblower disclosure channels 
because they allow corporations to avoid liability (and its 
attendant litigation costs) if sufficient processes are in place.135 
Yet, these pre-scandal versions of the Structural Model, like 
the Anti-retaliation Model, failed to encourage effective 
whistleblowing.  One problem was that whistleblower disclosure 
systems often did not provide a legitimate outlet for employees to 
provide information about misconduct, because the channels 
resulted in disclosure to a party who was either non-responsive or 
biased.  For example, under the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines, corporations could simply fail to respond to 
whistleblower complaints because the Guidelines do not specify 
to whom whistleblower disclosures must be reported.136 In the 
private sector, in order to satisfy the Guidelines, corporations 
implemented disclosure channels that flowed up through the 
corporate management hierarchy,137 placing employee disclosures 
at risk of management blocking and filtering.   
The Civil Service Reform Act exemplifies the related problem 
of reporting to a biased party.  The CSRA’s whistleblowing 
channel did not work, in large part because of the anti-employee 
bias of a series of Special Counsels who summarily failed to order 
investigations of employee complaints.138 Although the first two 
Special Counsels used this provision to order agency 
investigations for approximately twenty-five percent of employee 
complaints, beginning in 1983 a new Special Counsel drastically 
reduced the number of investigations ordered, to approximately 
7.5% of the complaints.139 In other words, whistleblower 
disclosures were being made, but the OSC rarely required 
agencies to confront the problems being raised.  Ultimately, the 
 
134 See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545-46 (1999); see also Callahan, 
et al. , supra note 125, at 194. 
135 See Callahan, et al., supra note 125, at 192-93; Sturm, supra note 130, at 557. 
136 See OSG, supra note 126, § 8A1.2, Application Note 3(k)(5). 
137 See Andrew R. Apel, A Presentation of Empirical Research on Compliance Practices: 
What Companies Say They are Doing – What Employees Hear, in GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 3, 
at 125-126; Edward S. Petry, A Presentation of Empirical Research on Compliance Practices: 
What Companies Say They are Doing – What Employees Hear, in GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 3, 
at 134. 
138 Devine & Aplin, supra note 119, at 52.  The discretion was magnified because 
“no standards of accountability were established for the OSC, the opportunity for 
judicial review was minimal, and no private right of action was created by the Act.”  
Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting 
the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 282 (1991) 
(footnotes omitted). 
139 See Devine & Aplin, supra note 119, at 53. 
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CSRA was amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 
but the unchallenged discretion of the Special Counsel to order 
investigations remains,140 leaving in doubt the ability of 
government employees to report wrongdoing effectively.141 
The second problem with the pre-scandal Structural Model 
was that companies had little incentive to implement effective 
whistleblower disclosure channels because courts and prosecutors 
rarely penalized bad systems or rewarded good ones.  
Specifically, corporations easily could create superficial structures 
 
140 The WPA made several changes to the whistleblower disclosure channel 
provisions of the CSRA.  For example, the WPA now permits a whistleblower to 
comment upon an agency’s report after it is submitted to the OSC.  See 5 U.S.C. § 
1213(e)(1) (1994).  This is an important provision because “the whistleblower is often in a 
good position to evaluate whether the agency’s response represents a good faith 
investigation.”  Thomas M. Devine, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: Foundation 
for the Modern Law of Employment Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 531, 562 n.174 (1999) 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-274 at 25 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
WPA also requires that the OSC send these whistleblower comments, the final agency 
report, and the OSC’s evaluation to the President and a congressional oversight 
committee, and to place them in a public file.  See 5 U.S.C. § 1219 (1994); Devine, supra, at 
562 n.176.  Further, the WPA reduces the risk to whistleblowers themselves by making it 
more difficult for the OSC to reveal a whistleblower’s identity.  Under the CSRA, the 
OSC could reveal a whistleblower’s identity in order to carry out the functions of the 
Special Counsel’s office.  See 5 U.S.C. § 1206(b)(1)(1988), subsequently repealed by Pub. L. 
101-12, § 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 21 (Apr. 10, 1989).  Under the WPA, the OSC may only identify 
a whistleblower without his or her consent if exposure is necessary “because of an 
imminent danger to public health or safety or imminent violation of any criminal law.”  
5 U.S.C. § 1213(h) (1994); see also Devine, supra, at 563-64 (describing this provision).  
Importantly, however, the OSC will not accept anonymous disclosures.  The OSC only 
will protect the confidentiality of the whistleblower to the extent permitted by Section 
1213(h).  See U.S. Office of Special Counsel, Whistleblower Disclosures (May 4, 2005), at 
www.osc.gov.  Of course, this process requires a fair amount of trust in the OSC by a 
federal whistleblowing employee.   
Despite these changes, the WPA’s focus was on the Anti-retaliation Model, not the 
Structural Model.  This failure to give sufficient attention to the whistleblower 
disclosure channels led one commentator to argue that the WPA “bypassed the process 
of maximizing constructive potential from dissent, a curious omission since one of the 
WPA’s objectives is to spark increased challenges to bureaucratic misconduct.”  Devine, 
supra, at 561. 
141 The most recent Annual Report from the OSC suggests that the OSC’s 
disclosure channel still does not operate consistently to provide a whistleblower’s 
information to his or her agency head.  From 2002 through 2004, only about 2.6% of 
employee disclosures were referred to agency heads for investigation.  See REPORT TO 
CONGRESS FROM THE U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004, 15 (2005), 
available at www.osc.gov.  The exact percentage is difficult to obtain from the annual 
report submitted by the OSC.  During FY 2002, 2003, and 2004, the OSC closed 1841 
disclosure matters.  Id.  During those same three years, it referred only 48 matters to 
agency heads.  Id. The closed matter numbers do not exactly correspond to agency 
referrals because there may be some overlap from year to year.  However, these raw 
numbers present a stark picture of the continued failure of the OSC to serve as the 
disclosure clearinghouse envisioned by the CSRA and the WPA. 
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merely to satisfy the OSG.  These structures often provided 
merely “window-dressing” and were not enforced in practice.142 
Indeed, the corporate scandals occurred with little outcry from 
corporate employees, despite every appearance at the scandal-
ridden corporations that sufficient mechanisms were in place to 
encourage the detection and reporting of fraud.  For example, 
Enron appeared on its face to satisfy the OSG standards for an 
effective compliance program, even if the program was not 
compliant in reality.143 Moreover, not only were superficial 
systems easy to create, but also government provided little 
incentive to do anything more.  Despite the possibility for 
substantial penalty reductions provided by the OSG, the OSG’s 
requirement that corporations implement “effective compliance 
systems” rarely helped a corporation facing criminal liability.  
From 1993 to 2004, only three organizations received a penalty 
reduction under the OSG for having an effective system.144 
Thus, prior to the corporate scandals, painful weaknesses of 
the Structural Model were enforcement and follow-through.  In 
the private sector, disclosures were directed to corporate 
executives rather than traditional corporate monitors, which 
restricted information flow.  An organization could have an 
excellent-appearing disclosure structure in place, but simply 
refuse to support it by actually responding to whistleblower 
disclosures.  Ineffective and unsupported disclosure channels 
failed to encourage employees to become whistleblowers and, if 
employees did blow the whistle, their disclosures rarely reached 
parties willing and able to address them.  
C.  Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model 
Sarbanes-Oxley implemented a new and improved version of 
the Structural Model.  Under Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley, the 
audit committee of the board of directors of public companies 
must establish procedures for receiving complaints regarding 
 
142 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated 
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491 (2003); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, The 
Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 
314 (2003-04). 
143 See Fiorelli, supra note 127, at 567 & 567 n.10; see also Charles M Elson & 
Christopher J. Gyves, In Re Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended Consequences, 39 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 702 (2004) (noting that Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, and Adelphia 
each had compliance systems, “none of which, obviously, was very effective”). 
144 See Frank O. Bowman, III, Drifting Down the Dnieper with Prince Potemkin: Some 
Skeptical Reflections About the Place of Compliance Programs in Federal Criminal Sentencing,
39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 684 (2004). 
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accounting, internal accounting controls, or auditing matters.145 
Additionally, the audit committee must be able to receive 
anonymous disclosures by employees regarding accounting or 
auditing matters.146 These requirements significantly alter the 
pre-scandal Structural Model in two ways.   
First, Sarbanes-Oxley improves the legitimacy of the 
disclosure channel.  It requires that independent directors on the 
board’s audit committee receive whistleblower disclosures.  This 
direct line to a traditional corporate monitor with the authority 
and responsibility to address whistleblower concerns enables 
whistleblowers to avoid the blocking and filtering of corporate 
executives.  As recognized by the SEC when it amended its 
general rules and regulations to implement Section 301 of the 
Act,147 directors typically rely upon managers of companies to 
provide them information, but management “may not have the 
appropriate incentives to self-report all questionable practices.”148 
Accordingly, the SEC rightfully recognized that “[t]he 
establishment of formal procedures for receiving and handling 
complaints should serve to facilitate disclosures, encourage 
proper individual conduct and alert the audit committee to 
potential problems before they have serious consequences.”149 
Moreover, Sarbanes-Oxley provides for anonymous disclosures,150 
which should improve the willingness of employees to come 
forward with information.  Requiring a legitimate disclosure 
channel will unleash the true potential of the Structural Model 
and reveal its power to overcome the information problems that 
undermined employees’ effectiveness as corporate monitors 
during the corporate scandals.  The model’s ability to improve 
information flow is discussed in the next Part.   
Second, for the first time in the private sector, the Structural 
Model is imposed broadly rather than merely encouraged.151 The 
 
145 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(A) (Supp. 2002). 
146 Id. §78j-1(m)(4)(B). 
147 See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Nos. 33-8220; 34-
47654, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Release] (promulgating 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10A-3, including subsection (b)(3) related to procedures for complaints). 
148 Id. at 18,798.  In light of the tremendous malfeasance by managers during the 
corporate scandals, this seems like somewhat of an understatement. 
149 See id. 
150 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(B) (Supp. 2002). 
151 The Structural Model also has been imposed in specific instances through 
consent decrees and other settlements by government agencies.  For example, in a 
consent decree with the SEC, Qwest Communications agreed to install a chief 
compliance officer, with reporting obligations to a committee of outside directors, who 
is responsible for responding to employee reports about misconduct.  See SEC Charges 
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Act instructs the Securities and Exchange Commission to direct 
the national securities exchanges and national securities 
associations (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange and the National 
Association of Securities Dealers) to prohibit the listing of any 
security of a company that is not in compliance with this 
requirement.152 The penalty for noncompliance with Section 301 
(and the corresponding listing rules) is delisting, which obviously 
can harm corporations and their shareholders significantly.153 
Although Sarbanes-Oxley mandated the implementation of 
the Structural Model, Congress did not mandate any specific 
requirements for the details of such a reporting system.  
Moreover, the SEC did not require specific procedures when it 
promulgated rules implementing Sarbanes-Oxley’s mandate, 
despite the fact that commentators who responded to the 
proposed rule “were split” over how specific the SEC should 
be.154 The majority of commentators on the SEC rules argued that 
the rules should give audit committees the flexibility to develop 
individualized procedures to receive complaints because of the 
diversity of companies affected by the Rule.155 The SEC based this 
minimalist regulatory approach on the diverse needs of a variety 
of corporations, arguing that corporations themselves  
should be provided with flexibility to develop and 
utilize procedures appropriate for their circumstances.  
The procedures that will be most effective to meet the 
requirements for a very small listed issuer with few 
employees could be very different from the processes 
and systems that would need to be in place for large, 
 
Qwest Communications International Inc. with Multi-Faceted Accounting and Financial 
Reporting Fraud, SEC Litigation Release No. 18935 (Oct. 21, 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18936.htm (cited in Marc I. Steinberg & 
Seth A. Kaufman, Minimizing Corporate Liability Exposure When the Whistle Blows in the 
Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 30 J. CORP. L. 445, 456 n.90 (2005)).  With regard to 
discrimination complaints, courts also have been active in approving corporate 
structural reform to address accusations of systematic bias within individual 
corporations.  See Sturm, supra note 130, at 509-19, 557 (describing system mandated by 
consent decree involving Home Depot). 
152 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(1)(A) (Supp. 2002). 
153 See Comments of Stanley Keller, Chair-Committee on Federal Regulation of 
Securities, Section of Business Law, American Bar Association (Feb. 25, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/skeller1.htm (“Delisting is a remedy 
with significant adverse consequences both to the issuer and its shareholders.  
Realistically, the failure to conform to a corporate governance listing standard in one 
primary market will leave no alternative comparable trading opportunity available for 
the company.”). 
154 See SEC Release, supra note 147, at 18,798. 
155 See id. 
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multi-national corporations with thousands of 
employees in many different jurisdictions.156 
Following the SEC’s lead, both the New York Stock Exchange and 
the NASDAQ merely required that their listed companies have 
audit committees that complied with the SEC’s Rule.157 
Sarbanes-Oxley thus responded to the failings of the pre-
scandal Structural Model in two ways.  First, the Act implemented 
a whistleblower disclosure channel that provides information 
directly to independent corporate directors.  As described in the 
next Part, this change directly addresses the flow-of-information 
problems demonstrated by the corporate scandals.  Second, 
Sarbanes-Oxley mandated the implementation of a disclosure 
channel in every public corporation.  Although this mandatory 
implementation is an improvement, I suggest in Part V of this 
Article that Sarbanes-Oxley’s minimalist approach fails to address 
key potential problems with the model.      
IV. THE POWER OF SARBANES-OXLEY’S STRUCTURAL 
MODEL 
As utilized by Sarbanes-Oxley, the Structural Model should 
encourage more effective whistleblowing than the Anti-retaliation 
Model or previous versions of the Structural Model.  Sarbanes-
Oxley’s Structural Model overcomes the flow-of-information 
problems exposed by the recent scandals by implementing a 
legitimate whistleblower disclosure channel.  Through its 
legitimacy, the channel encourages employees to become active 
corporate monitors and to disclose corporate misconduct.  As 
important, this channel facilitates the movement of this 
information from the employees – the corporate players with the 
most information – to the traditional corporate monitors – the 
corporate players with the power and responsibility to utilize the 
information effectively.  Thus, the Structural Model’s power lies 
in its ability to increase both the amount and the effectiveness of 
disclosures from whistleblowing employees.   
A.  More Disclosures 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model should increase the 
amount of whistleblowing because it provides incentives for 
 
156 See id. 
157 See NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 303A (Nov. 3, 2004); NASD Rules, § 
4350(d)(3) (2005). 
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employees to become whistleblowers and reduces several of the 
most significant disincentives to whistleblowing.  By contrast, the 
Anti-retaliation Model provides little, if any, incentive to blow the 
whistle and addresses, somewhat poorly, only one disincentive to 
whistleblowing – the fear of retaliation. 
Studies demonstrate that designating a uniform recipient of 
whistleblower complaints in an organization and directing 
employees to that recipient is associated with increased amounts 
of whistleblowing.158 Perhaps one reason for this increased 
whistleblowing is that employees become whistleblowers out of a 
sense of loyalty to their organization.159 Contrary to popular 
belief regarding the traitorous nature of such “snitches,” 
whistleblowers often are employees with long tenure who believe 
they serve the organization’s best interests by providing 
information about organizational wrongdoing.160 The 
whistleblowers involved in the recent corporate scandals seem to 
satisfy this documented generalization.  Both Sherron Watkins of 
Enron and Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom profess (albeit self-
servingly) to being driven by their sense of loyalty to their 
organizations and appear truly disappointed that greedy 
corporate officers destroyed the organizations they admired.161 
An internal disclosure channel provides a way for employees to 
demonstrate their loyalty by disclosing misconduct without 
having to report colleagues to “outside” authorities.   
 
158 See Karen L. Hooks, et al., Enhancing Communication to Assist in Fraud Prevention 
and Detection, 13 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 86, 93 (1994). 
159 As Cass Sunstein has noted with regard to people who dissent publicly: 
There is an ironic point here. . . .   Conformists are often thought to be 
protective of social interests, keeping quiet for the sake of the group.  By 
contrast, dissenters tend to be seen as selfish individualists, embarking on 
projects of their own.  But in an important sense, the opposite is closer to 
the truth.  Much of the time, dissenters benefit others, while conformists 
benefit themselves. 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 6 (2003). 
160 See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 103, at 79-80; MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 169-
70; David Culp, Whistleblowers: Corporate Anarchists or Heroes? Towards a Judicial 
Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 115 (1995); Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 
138, at 300-01. 
161 See Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 63, at 32 (asserting that Watkins and Cooper, 
along with Coleen Rowley of the FBI, are the “truest of true believers . . . ever faithful to 
the idea that where they worked was a place that served the wider world in some 
important way”); Ripley, supra note 36, at 47-49 (describing Cooper’s reaction to 
discovery of WorldCom’s fraud); Jodie Morse & Amanda Bower, The Party Crasher,
TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 53, 53 (Watkins’s reaction). 
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A disclosure channel harmonizes with the tendency of 
employee whistleblowers to report misconduct internally162 – a 
tendency that seems driven by the whistleblower’s sense of 
loyalty.  Sherron Watkins reported her misgivings to Ken Lay, but 
not publicly until she was called to testify before a House 
committee investigating Enron’s bankruptcy.  Cynthia Cooper 
reported her findings first to WorldCom’s CFO and then to the 
company’s Board of Directors.  A similar pattern emerged in the 
scandals at Xerox, Global Crossing, Duke Power, and in the 
mutual funds scandal, whereby an employee attempted to resolve 
a problem internally so that the company could fix it and remain 
viable.163 In fact, this type of structure fits well with the psyche of 
the American employee, whose sense of loyalty to the 
organization keeps her from reporting misconduct externally but 
who may be willing to report internally if encouraged by the 
organization.164 
In addition to providing an incentive to whistleblowers by 
encouraging loyalty, the Structural Model should reduce the most 
visible disincentives to whistleblowing behavior.  For example, 
the model should reduce the amount of retaliation against 
whistleblowers because the model focuses on the recipient of a 
whistleblower complaint rather than on the whistleblower.  
Studies demonstrate that the recipient of complaints plays a large 
role in determining both the outcome of that particular complaint 
and whether subsequent whistleblowers will feel free to come 
 
162 See, e.g., MYRON PERETZ GLAZER & PENINA MIGDAL GLAZER, THE 
WHISTLEBLOWERS: EXPOSING CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 195 (1989); 
KAREN L. SOEKEN & DONALD R. SOEKEN, A SURVEY OF WHISTLEBLOWERS: THEIR STRESSORS 
AND COPING STRATEGIES 160 (1987); Callahan, et al., supra note 125, at 195; Dworkin & 
Callahan, supra note 138, at 300–01; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 335–37; 
Gregory R. Watchman, Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers: A New Corporate Early Warning 
System, at 8 (Nov. 2004), available at 
http://www.whistleblower.org/doc/GAP%20Analysis%20Sarbanes%2DO 
xley%2Epdf. 
163 See note 38 supra (Duke Power); note 51, supra (Global Crossing); Christine 
Dugas, Whistle-Blower Tells Story of Mutual Fund Scandal, USA TODAY, May 26, 2005, 
available at http://www.yourlawyer.com/practice/printnews.htm?story_id7377 
(mutual funds); O’Donnell, supra note 41 (mutual funds); Whistleblowing: Peep and Weep,
THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2002, available at http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/ 
3002918?f=options (Xerox).  This tendency is clear in Watkins’ letter to Ken Lay, in 
which she attempted to present solutions for Enron to “fix” the accounting 
improprieties she discovered.  See Letter from Sherron Watkins to Kenneth Lay, available 
at http://energycommerce.house.gov/0107/Hearings/02072002hearing485/tab17.pdf. 
164 Coffee, supra note 25, at 1242 (asserting that encouraging external 
whistleblowing may be ineffective because it is so ingrained in corporate mentality to be 
loyal and to withhold adverse information). 
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forward.165 By requiring that the top echelon of a corporation 
receive complaints, whistleblowers are more likely to have 
support from upper levels of the corporation.  This “top-down” 
support will reduce the amount of retaliation felt by employees, 
and therefore encourage more whistleblowing.166 Further, this 
structure allows whistleblowers to avoid conflicted supervisors or 
high-ranking managers who are likely to feel defensive about 
wrongdoing occurring in their department.167 Additionally, 
because Sarbanes-Oxley permits employees to report wrongdoing 
anonymously or confidentially, employees’ fear of retaliation 
should be minimized.168 Thus, the Structural Model implemented 
by Sarbanes-Oxley reduces the significant deterrent of retaliation 
in a different, and perhaps more effective, manner than the Anti-
retaliation Model.169 
Behavioral studies of whistleblowers demonstrate that a 
larger disincentive to whistleblowing than fear of retaliation is 
employees’ concern that nothing will be done in response to their 
complaints.170 This concern was justified during the latest 
corporate scandals, as employees in scandal-ridden companies 
routinely watched those who broke the law receive promotions 
and raises.171 Understandably, employees are usually unwilling 
to take the tremendous career and social risks associated with 
whistleblowing if their report has little potential to change the 
status quo.  While the Anti-retaliation Model does little to reduce 
 
165 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 77. 
166 See Marcia P. Miceli, et al., Can Laws Protect Whistle-Blowers? Results of a 
Naturally Occurring Field Experiment, 26 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 129, 134, 143-44 (1999). 
167 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 184. 
168 Not surprisingly, studies consistently demonstrate that individuals are more 
willing to state a dissenting viewpoint if they can do so anonymously.  See MIETHE, supra 
note 49, at 54-57; SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 20.  Permitting such anonymous reporting 
does have downsides: often such reports are not as trustworthy and there is little 
opportunity for feedback or follow-up.  However, to the extent the Anti-retaliation 
Model is not working effectively, anonymous reporting may encourage those who are 
otherwise reluctant to speak out for fear of retribution. 
169 The Structural Model also reinforces the Anti-retaliation Model.  As a practical 
matter, retaliating against a whistleblowing employee will be significantly more difficult 
if the employee utilizes an internal reporting structure.  The employee’s disclosure will 
be documented and any subsequent employment action against the employee most 
likely will trigger extra review by the corporation. 
170 See Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 333-37 (citing survey responses to 
assert that a primary reason employees do not blow the whistle is because the employee 
believes that nothing will be done to correct the activity); see also MICELI & NEAR, supra 
note 6, at 65-66; Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 302, Hooks, et al., supra note 158, 
at 93.   
171 See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 3, at 139, 153-54, 187 (describing promotions 
and raises for Andrew Fastow, Ken Rice, and Ben Gilson at Enron). 
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this disincentive, the Structural Model addresses it by requiring 
that disclosures go directly to the board of directors.  This 
structure increases the odds of a positive corporate response to 
the information because the directors are corporate monitors with 
a fiduciary duty to address misconduct.172 Rather than simply 
providing information to a manager and hoping someone with 
actual authority receives it, the Structural Model guarantees that 
the appropriate corporate leaders will consider it.   
Corporate and societal pressures to remain quiet are 
additional disincentives to whistleblowing.  Corporations push 
employees into going along with illegal actions in order to be 
“loyal” to the organization.173 Furthermore, society discourages 
individuals from being “squealers” and betraying loyalties.174 
Arguably, it simply may be human nature to conform to group 
norms and to gain acceptance from our peers.175 The broad 
employee silence during the corporate scandals is strong evidence 
of the existence of this behavioral norm. 
Judges and other decision-makers may be hesitant to impose 
stiff criminal and civil sanctions upon managers who use 
retaliation to enforce this norm, thus making the norm especially 
“sticky” and difficult to overcome.176 To paraphrase Dan Kahan’s 
theory regarding sticky norms in general, sometimes a “gentle 
nudge” like the Structural Model may be more effective in 
altering sticky norms than “hard shoves” like the Anti-retaliation 
Model.177 In other words, the Structural Model provides a more 
moderate reform that is less likely to alienate the very people 
charged with encouraging whistleblowing.  This more temperate 
approach may subtly alter corporate norms of secrecy and 
 
172 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
173 For example, a whistleblower at Fannie Mae recently stated that other 
employees did not report wrongdoing at the company because of Fannie Mae’s 
corporate environment, which he described as “one of intimidation, restraint of 
dissenting opinions, and pressure to be part of the ‘Team,’ giving [corporate officers] the 
numbers [they] desired to please the markets.”  See Peter Eavis, Fannie’s Hedging Deals 
Look Thorny, THESTREET.COM, at 
http://www.thestreet.com/comment/detox/10187363.html (Oct. 15, 2004).   
174 See Estlund, supra note 9, at 123; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 333-37. 
175 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 9; Cunningham, supra note 142, at 317; John M. 
Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational Corruption, 70 
BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1189-92 (2005). 
176 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms 
Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000) (describing the “sticky norms problem” 
whereby “the presence of a social norm makes decisionmakers reluctant to carry out a 
law  intended to change that norm”). 
177 See Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 176, at 608; see also Eric A. Posner, Law, 
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 114 U. PENN. L. REV. 1697, 1730-31 (1996). 
To Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers 
3/5/2006   Page 39  
 
retaliation to make open communication more viable.  
Implementing a whistleblower disclosure channel will signal to 
employees that the management and ownership of the firm are 
committed to corporate ethics.178 Although enforcement of the 
use of the channel is limited,179 the mere existence of the channel 
may demonstrate to employees that reporting misconduct is 
appropriate and expected.180 
Sarbanes-Oxley may be specifically influential in this regard 
because it mandates that the board of directors receive 
whistleblower disclosures, a structure that signals the importance 
of this type of employee monitoring and reporting.181 As a result, 
the actual behavior of directors, managers, and employees may 
change because they have a more formal role in preventing 
corporate fraud.182 This requirement, in turn, may encourage 
these corporate officers to become more committed to the norm of 
open communication.183 Employees, in turn, will take their cue 
not only from the existence of the structural disclosure channel, 
but also from the acceptance of the channel by their managers and 
 
178 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 30 (arguing for the importance of creating a 
culture that “welcomes disagreement and that does not punish those who depart from 
the prevailing orthodoxy,” and suggesting that creating “channels by which dissent can 
be expressed anonymously” might encourage such a culture); Brett H. McDonnell, Sox 
Appeals, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 530 (2004) (asserting that “norms of good behavior 
can be as important a limit on managerial misbehavior” as other disciplinary 
mechanisms). 
179 Enforcement is geared toward requiring the existence of the channel, not 
towards regulating its use.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(m)(1)(A) (Supp. 2002); 17 C.F.R. §240.10A-3(a). 
180 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PENN. L. REV.
2021, 2032 (1996) (arguing that even an under-enforced law may serve an expressive 
function that can alter behavior in signaling “appropriate behavior and in inculcating 
the expectation of social opprobrium and, hence, shame in those who deviate from the 
announced norm”). 
181 See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate 
Compliance with the Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 104 (2002) (“If the firm’s 
commitment to certain behaviors can be communicated successfully, this should be a 
strong pull.  And if other agents publicly signal their adherence to the policy, conformity 
pressures will go to work as well.  A positive compliance culture will evolve.”); cf. 
Estlund, supra note 77, at 375 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley plays an important role “by 
protecting and institutionalizing employee whistleblowing”).  Cf. MICELI & NEAR, supra 
note 6, at 144. 
182 Cf. Kostant, supra note 69, at 556-58 (arguing that corporate lawyers may 
become better corporate watchdogs because of their more formalized role under 
Sarbanes-Oxley).  Professor Kostant’s arguments that Sarbanes-Oxley may change the 
social norms for attorneys seems equally applicable to effect a more formalized structure 
for reporting misconduct may have on altering the social norm against whistleblowing 
that exists in many corporations.  Cf. id. 
183 See Kahan, supra note 176, at 635-36. 
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supervisors.184 This changing social attitude can cascade and 
expand until a more pervasive norm develops, one in which 
employees understand that reporting misconduct is expected and 
encouraged because disclosures ultimately benefit the 
corporation.185 
Accordingly, under the Structural Model, not reporting may 
actually be seen as disloyal, and those who stand mute in the face 
of wrongdoing may be considered defectors from the norm, 
subject to social sanctions like ostracism, or even employment 
sanctions.186 For example, when WorldCom emerged from 
bankruptcy as MCI, the company conducted an intensive internal 
investigation and fired fifty employees, many of whom were not 
involved in the fraud, but who likely knew about it.187 Structural 
encouragements can become self-fulfilling as they are given 
legitimacy by legal and human resource professionals within the 
corporation.188 As Peter Kostant has argued, “[a] slight 
adjustment, or clarification of social meaning, can powerfully 
affect norms of behavior.”189 
This theoretical approach to social norms finds support in 
research regarding influences on whistleblowing behavior.  
Studies demonstrate that internal whistleblowing increases when 
ethical and legal compliance policies exist in an organization,190 
particularly if specific whistleblowing procedures are in place.191 
Such reporting procedures give whistleblowers more power by 
officially providing encouragement and protection to 
whistleblowers.192 Indeed, two of the most prominent social 
science researchers of whistleblowing behavior contend that the 
best approach for encouraging whistleblowing “would be to set 
up internal complaint procedures where concerned employees 
could report, and make sure that those procedures provide for 
speedy and impartial review.”193 
Thus, whistleblowing will increase if attitudes of significant 
corporate players and the corporation’s social norms encourage 
 
184 See id. 
185 See Sunstein, supra note 180, at 2033 (discussing the development of “’norm 
cascades’ as reputational incentives shift behavior in new directions”). 
186 See id. at 2029-30. 
187 See McCafferty, supra note 74.   
188 See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The 
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401, 1406–17 (1990). 
189 See Kostant, supra note 69, at 553.  
190 See Trevino, supra note 25, at 1198-1201. 
191 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 150. 
192 See id. at 223. 
193 Id. at 249; see also Dworkin, supra note 103, at 474. 
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it.194 Indeed, it is commonly argued that, in order to encourage 
whistleblowers, corporations need to develop a more ethical and 
open corporate culture, implemented from the top of the 
organizational hierarchy.195 Yet, other than relying upon 
enlightened corporate leaders, specific recommendations 
regarding how society can implement such a corporate culture are 
rare because it is difficult (if not impossible) for the government to 
mandate a culture of honesty.  Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model 
might provide a means of encouraging the development of such 
an ethical corporate culture by mandating both a process for 
whistleblowers to follow and a high-level recipient for 
whistleblower disclosures.       
There are obvious limitations to the ability of the Structural 
Model to turn employees into corporate monitors.  Like any 
corporate monitor, employees suffer from cognitive biases that 
may inhibit them from spotting and reporting wrongdoing.  For 
example, in the face of ambiguous evidence of wrongdoing, 
employees tend to interpret information to avoid conflict.196 Also, 
employees have a “cognitive conservatism” that makes it difficult 
to readjust one’s perspective to account for new information,197 
particularly if, as some theorize, corrupt corporate behavior 
begins with acts that are only minimally improper, which then 
gradually expand into larger acts of wrongdoing.198 When 
combined with a bias for the status quo and a tendency to 
perceive information as normal rather than abnormal, employees 
face difficulties as corporate monitors.199 These difficulties 
suggest that employees should not be a corporation’s sole source 
of monitoring.  But, employees can, and should, be one part of the 
overall corporate monitoring system.  As part of that system, a 
visible and legitimate whistleblower disclosure channel that 
encourages and rewards the reporting of misconduct may cause 
employees to give credence to their own concerns by challenging 
their inherent assumptions and biases.  The structure of an 
effective disclosure channel will reduce disincentives to coming 
forward by reducing corporate and societal pressures to remain 
 
194 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 158-60; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 9, at 
326. 
195 See Westin, Conclusion, supra note 54, at 143-49. 
196 See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 86-87 (describing this tendency as “motivated 
inference”). 
197 See id. 
198 See Darley, supra note 175, at 1186-88. 
199 See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 86-90 (discussing these same attributes as 
they apply to whether supervisors can capably monitor employees to prevent 
wrongdoing). 
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quiet.  When implemented along with anti-retaliation protections, 
the Structural Model should encourage more whistleblowing from 
corporate employees. 
B.  Less Blocking and Filtering 
A second significant benefit of the Structural Model is that it 
should increase whistleblowers’ effectiveness, because the model 
provides a channel for employees to give information directly to 
the board of a corporation.  An unimpeded avenue to the 
directors allows whistleblowers to bypass the information 
blocking and filtering by corporate executives and other 
managers.  Moreover, because it is relatively unfiltered, the 
information from someone outside of the corporate governing 
circle may prompt directors to critically examine the information 
they receive from the corporate managers.  The independent 
directors on the audit committee “have a tremendous reputational 
stake in compliance with the law, and almost no countervailing 
financial stake in its violation . . . [therefore, they] are likely to 
insist on correcting internal problems rather than covering them 
up.”200 Providing reports to the traditional monitors, particularly 
the board of directors, will be the key to the model’s success.   
Furthermore, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model makes it 
more difficult for directors to ignore the information received 
from these employees.201 One problem with the traditional 
monitoring system is that it relies upon enforcement of fiduciary 
duties for monitors through a liability system that makes it 
extremely difficult to prove breach of a fiduciary duty of care 
unless direct knowledge of wrongdoing is demonstrated.  Thus, 
the traditional system encourages directors to avoid receiving 
information about potential misconduct in the corporation 
because there is no breach of fiduciary duty when the directors 
have no direct knowledge of wrongdoing.  The Structural Model 
makes it more difficult for directors to avoid the type of 
knowledge that requires action in order to fulfill their fiduciary 
duties.  Most whistleblowing systems provide effective 
documentation of information passed from an employee to the 
responsible monitor.  Indeed, after the corporate scandals, the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were amended to require 
that the organization’s “governing authority,” (most likely the 
board of directors) must have knowledge about, and exercise 
 
200 Kostant, supra note 69, at 556. 
201 See Developments in the Law, supra note 71, at 2247 n.134. 
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reasonable oversight of, the compliance program.202 Part of this 
oversight must include receiving annual reports from individuals 
who are operationally responsible for the program.203 Similarly, 
under Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model, directors could not 
claim – as they did with Enron – that they were unaware of 
potential misconduct.  Although directors may still ignore or 
underestimate the information because it comes from a source 
outside of their small group,204 they will do so at their own peril.  
At a minimum, a disclosure channel forces directors to confront 
officers with the information or be liable for their failure to do so.  
In this way, the Structural Model reinforces the already-existing 
duties and obligations of the traditional monitors.   
Thus, by circumventing the blocking and filtering of corporate 
executives, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model will make 
whistleblower disclosures more effective in that disclosures to 
directors are more likely to cause the corporation to address the 
misconduct of its executives and managers. 
C.  Secondary Benefits 
The history of the Structural Model demonstrates that it must 
have some organizational acceptance in order to work.  For 
example, the disastrous reign of two Special Counsels eviscerated 
the disclosure provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act because 
they did not follow through on employee disclosures 
effectively.205 For organizational acceptance to occur, the benefits 
of this model to the corporation must outweigh its costs.  Truly 
workable and effective disclosure systems are more likely to be 
implemented when the corporation can be convinced that 
encouraging whistleblowers is in its best interest.  Fortunately, 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model could provide significant 
benefits directly to the corporation.   
1.  Encouraging Internal Whistleblowing   
An important benefit for corporations is that the Structural 
Model encourages internal whistleblowing.206 When an employee 
 
202 OSG, supra note 126, § 8B2.1(b)(2)(A) (2004); Application Note 1. 
203 Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C); Application Note 3. 
204 See Fanto, supra note 24, at 460-72. 
205 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
206 See DANIEL P. WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 
171 (1991) (“Employees may be less likely to complain outside their organizations if they 
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reports wrongdoing internally rather than externally, corporations 
learn about mistaken employee views and perspectives before 
these mistaken views are made public, after which they are harder 
to correct.207 This early detection allows corporations to avoid 
costs related to the negative publicity and government 
intervention that follows external whistleblowing.208 It also gives 
corporations the opportunity to correct misconduct earlier and 
thereby save costs related to future litigation.209 Further, internal 
whistleblowing may attract whistleblowers who are loyal to the 
corporation and thus are motivated to improve the corporation – 
as compared to whistleblowers who report externally and may 
have more negative motivations.  These whistleblowers also are 
less likely to experience retaliation when they report internally 
rather than externally.210 
One criticism of encouraging internal whistleblowing is that it 
may not be beneficial for society because misconduct is more 
easily hidden and covered up if it is reported internally.211 
However, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model should reduce this 
negative aspect of internal whistleblowing by directing 
whistleblower reports to corporate monitors with fiduciary duties 
to investigate and with significant exposure for failing to disclose 
any material misconduct they discover.212 Moreover, the 
Structural Model does not prohibit external whistleblowing – it 
simply facilitates internal whistleblowing in order to encourage a 
greater overall amount of whistleblowing. 
 
believe that their companies have effective internal mechanisms for expressing dissent 
and achieving change.”); Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 300-02. 
207 See Callahan, supra note 103, at 882, 904-06; Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet 
Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241, 243 (1987); 
Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 299-300; Vaughn, supra note 89, at 599. 
208 See Callahan, supra note 103, at 882, 904-06; Dworkin & Near, supra note 207, at 
242. 
209 See Culp, supra note 160, at 124, 132; Robert G. Vaughn, et al., The Whistleblower 
Statute Prepared for the Organization of American States and the Global Legal Revolution 
Protecting Whistleblowers, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 857, 868 (2003). 
210 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 302; Dworkin & Near, supra note 
110, at 6. 
211 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 284; Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful 
Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1966-68 (1996). 
212 See Cherry, supra note 8, at 1073 (noting that the reporting channel of Sarbanes-
Oxley would provide evidence for government investigators and plaintiff’s attorneys 
regarding corporate knowledge of wrongdoing). 
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2. Better Corporate Decision-Making   
To the extent that a corporation truly implements structural 
changes that improve the flow of information, corporate decision-
making should improve.213 Boards of directors need to be open to 
different and dissenting points of view in order to improve the 
quality of their decision-making.214 Evidence from studies of 
corporate boards demonstrates that “companies do best if they 
have highly contentious boards ‘that regard dissent as an 
obligation and that treat no subject as undiscussable.’  Well-
functioning boards contain a range of viewpoints and encourage 
tough questions, challenging the prevailing orthodoxy.”215 In 
accordance with this viewpoint, James Fanto suggested 
improving the board of directors by appointing outside directors 
to play a “whistleblowing” function in order to combat pervasive 
“group think.”216 Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model augments 
this suggestion by directing actual whistleblowers to disclose 
information to the board of directors, thereby providing the board 
information with which to make more informed decisions. 
On a broader note, the Structural Model also helps encourage 
dissent more generally by encouraging employees to speak out 
immediately and directly.  This process may lead to better 
decision-making for the corporation because groups make better 
decisions when a variety of viewpoints are considered.217 
Without dissent from individuals, groups tend to conform to 
more extreme positions – positions not held individually by most 
of the members of the group.218 Moreover, dissenters can play an 
important role in breaking informational cascades, in which a 
group of people uniformly fall in line with a few influential 
people who may be mistaken.219 The essential problem with such 
cascading is that individuals with a minority view often self-
censor in the face of this group pressure, which keeps valuable 
information from the group and leads to inferior decision-
making.220 Through a disclosure channel, whistleblowers can 
 
213 See, e.g., MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 228-29. 
214 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 2; O’Connor, supra note 23, at 1304-06; Westin, 
Conclusion, supra note 54, at 138-39. 
215 SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 2 (internal quotation not cited in original). 
216 See Fanto, supra note 24, at 507-09. 
217 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 159, at 9 (“[C]lose-knit groups, discouraging conflict 
and disagreement, often do badly because of this type of conformity.  The problem is 
that people are failing to disclose what they know and believe.”). 
218 See generally id. at 111-44 (discussing “group polarization”). 
219 See id. at 66-73. 
220 See id. at 118. 
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provide an important dissenting voice which may improve a 
corporation’s decision-making, particularly at the board level. 
3.  Reducing Monitoring Costs 
Despite the benefits that whistleblowing can bring to 
corporations and to society, whistleblowing – like any monitoring 
mechanism – has costs.  Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model, 
however, minimizes those costs and, where appropriate, reduces 
the costs of whistleblowing more effectively than the Anti-
retaliation Model. 
The Structural Model has obvious costs associated with 
maintaining a structure to receive, disseminate, and investigate 
employee disclosures.221 These costs, of course, will vary 
depending upon the complexity of the system,222 and may affect 
smaller companies more than larger corporations.223 Interestingly, 
though, when the SEC enacted rules implementing the structural 
changes of Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley, it did not receive any 
specific data in response to its request for information related to 
possible costs of such systems,224 perhaps signaling that the cost of 
such structures is not overwhelming for public companies.225 
In addition to the mechanical nuts and bolts of implementing 
a reporting system, opportunity costs must be considered.  
Executives and managers who are monitored by employees may 
forgo activity that is profitable and legal, but that may put them at 
risk of being reported.226 Shareholders may want these executives 
and managers to test or even to cross the boundaries of legality 
 
221 See SEC Release, supra note 147, at 18,813 (noting that there will be “ongoing 
costs” in establishing procedures for handling complaints and in monitoring compliance 
with those procedures). 
222 Cf. Matthias Schmidt, “Whistle Blowing” Regulation and Accounting Standards 
Enforcement in Germany and Europe – An Economic Perspective, Humboldt Univ. Bus. & 
Econ. Discussion Paper No. 29, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=438840 (Aug. 
2003), at 26 (noting that for internal whistleblowing rules to be effective, tremendous 
company resources may be required, such as continuous training for management and 
employees, implementing hotlines, and identifying ombudspersons). 
223 See SEC Release, supra note 147, at 18,816. 
224 See id. at 18,814. 
225 Anecdotal evidence also supports the notion that companies may not find the 
cost of certain disclosure systems prohibitive, particularly when compared with the 
benefit of increased employee monitoring.  See Judy Dahl, Whistle-Blower Program Lets 
Employees Speak Up, Credit Union Directors Newsletter (Dec. 2005) (describing 
whistleblower hotline implemented by Texas credit union, which the credit union’s 
internal auditor called a “bargain”) (on file with author). 
226 See Ribstein, supra note 17, at 284; see also MIETHE, supra note 49, at 87 (noting 
that over-surveillance of employees can lead to employees that are overly cautious). 
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because, at times, it may be more profitable for shareholders if a 
corporation violates the law, particularly if the penalties and the 
chance of being caught are low.227 Yet, increasing the role of 
employees in corporate governance by encouraging monitoring 
and reporting may not dramatically increase the opportunity costs 
that the corporation already incurs through other monitoring.  As 
Larry Backer has noted,  
[M]uch of the obligations imposed on directors, 
officers and gatekeepers, all fall on employees.  
Employees are usually the people who actually gather 
the information necessary for the functioning of the 
due diligence, monitoring, or information systems 
mandated by [Sarbanes-Oxley] and related statutes.  
Employees tend also to be responsible for first cut 
analysis and decisions with respect to the relevance of 
particular bits of information.  To a large extent, a large 
firm must rely on its employees, a large number of 
whom must be trusted to gather, analyze and produce 
information that is essential for the compliance by 
responsible officers, directors and gatekeepers of their 
legal obligations.228 
While employees already are asked to monitor, organizations fail 
to offer an incentive to accurately report their findings to 
corporate leadership.  Thus, because all monitoring mechanisms 
have costs that must be considered in comparison to the costs of 
other controls,229 it is noteworthy that the marginal opportunity 
costs of encouraging employees to report incidents of misconduct 
may not be significant given employees’ current monitoring roles. 
Another cost of encouraging whistleblowing (and the 
monitoring that goes along with it) is that a corporation may 
discover wrongdoing for which it may be liable to some third-
 
227 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 10 (“[E]thical issues aside, from a 
shareholder’s standpoint, illegal acts may be worthwhile if their expected benefits 
outweigh their expected costs.  In addition, some investors may view managerial 
attempts to test the legal waters as preferable to always proceeding in a risk-averse 
manner.  Wealth-maximizing shareholders may consider it desirable for managers to 
occasionally get caught trying to cheat.” (quoting W. N. Davidson & D. L. Worrell, The 
Impact of Announcements of Corporate Illegalities, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 195, 198 (1988)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
228 Larry Catá Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing 
Corporate Monitoring after Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 370 (2004). 
229 Cf. Kraakman, supra note 19, at 75-87 (discussing costs of legal enforcement 
through third-party liability) 
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party.230 Having an employee engage in wrongdoing, and then 
subsequently exposing the wrongdoing as a company, can bring 
financial penalties to a corporation, litigation expenses, negative 
publicity, and increased scrutiny by regulators.231 This cost is not 
uniform among companies, and will be greater for those 
corporations that are engaging in fraudulent activities.232 
Assuming most companies are not acting illegally, this overall 
cost may be insignificant for the vast majority of corporations.233 
Furthermore, these costs may seem higher to corporations 
than they are in reality, because managers often confuse their own 
personal costs with costs to the corporation.  As Richard Painter 
notes, “Managers often lose their careers if misconduct is 
disclosed, whereas organizations may suffer only temporary loss 
of reputation.  Managers usually bear the brunt of criminal 
liability for misconduct, whereas organizations do not go to 
jail.”234 In short, corporations may actually receive benefits from 
getting caught earlier (because less wrongdoing occurs), but 
managers may underemphasize these benefits because getting 
caught gives managers significant legal exposure.235 This agency 
failure – whereby managers “overemphasize costs and 
underemphasize benefits” of getting caught236 – should make the 
Structural Model more attractive to shareholders to the extent it 
increases corporate compliance and facilitates earlier detection of 
corporate fraud. 
An additional source of costs from a whistleblower system 
comes from likely error, including intentional error by purported 
whistleblowers.  Whistleblowers could use the system 
opportunistically to gain some sort of job security by disclosing 
imaginary misconduct,237 to achieve an advantage in promotion 
 
230 Cf. Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search 
of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 221, 224 (1995) (noting that an 
obvious cost to clients of engaging an attorney who will be a whistleblower is the “cost 
of misconduct being exposed”). 
231 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 282; see also ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON,
WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS – AND WHY 75 (2003). 
232 See Painter, supra note 230, at 224, 263. 
233 See id. at 224. 
234 Id. at 263-64.  Of course, management turnover may impose its own costs, such 
as replacement costs and a “loss of cohesion within the organization.”  See Langevoort, 
supra note 27, at 295-96. 
235 See Painter, supra note 230, at 263-64. 
236 See id. at 264-65. 
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or salary by wrongly reporting a co-employee,238 or simply to hurt 
the employer in retaliation for some perceived slight.239 
Alternatively, reporting errors could occur simply because an 
employee does not fully understand an ambiguous and complex 
situation in which it might be difficult to discern legal from illegal 
conduct.240 The costs of such erroneous claims include costs 
associated with internal investigations, litigation expenses, 
opportunity costs, potential penalties, and costs related to 
becoming a possible target for government regulators.241 
Although incidents of malicious whistleblowing are rare,242 
the Structural Model can serve to slightly reduce the costs of 
whistleblower errors in general by channeling whistleblower 
disclosures internally rather than externally.  Although there will 
be investigative costs, a corporation that receives erroneous 
disclosures internally at least has the possibility of providing 
feedback and correct information to a whistleblowing 
employee.243 This early response may keep a whistleblower from 
going public with flawed information, thus reducing the overall 
costs of defending against such charges.  Moreover, even if the 
mistaken whistleblower makes a public accusation after an 
internal accusation, the company will have investigated the 
complaints and thus be able to explain publicly the reasons why 
those complaints were dismissed after the internal 
investigation.244 
With regard to workers that intentionally make false claims, 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model may actually reduce costs 
 
Economics of Deterrence, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 91, 99, 123 (arguing that inhibiting the right 
of employer to fire employee will raise the cost of labor because it reduces the ability to 
fire inefficient employees, which makes the employer’s workforce less efficient, and thus 
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because it will lead to spurious claims that increase litigation and administrative 
expenses); see generally Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard 
Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101 (1988). 
238 Cf. Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 142, 421 N.E.2d 876, 884 
(1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (expressing concern about protecting whistleblowers in the 
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239 See Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Employee’s Duty of 
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investigated thoroughly but could not substantiate a whistleblower’s claims). 
242 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 303. 
243 See id. at 304. 
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associated with such accusations.  Employers likely will document 
any whistleblowing disclosures made through the approved 
channel as well as any subsequent investigation, which may 
lessen the factual “he said/she said” nature of whistleblowing 
claims regarding when a disclosure was made, the content of the 
disclosure, and the relationship of the disclosure to an 
employment action.  Moreover, whistleblower disclosures may 
never be provided to supervisors who make employment 
decisions, thus shielding these supervisors from intentionally 
retaliating against a whistleblower.  Furthermore, if it is 
necessary, utilizing a whistleblowing structure will enable 
corporations to prevent retaliation against users of the system by 
frustrated managers, which also will reduce litigation 
expenditures.   
Finally, a common argument against promoting 
whistleblowing is that it will undermine corporate culture by 
encouraging secrecy, destabilizing management authority, and 
diminishing morale.245 Each of these phenomena represents 
potential costs for a corporation.  Whistleblowing may damage a 
corporation’s ability to maintain confidential business 
information, thus forcing it to create systems to maintain secrecy 
of its vital corporate information.246 It is costly to create these 
additional systems, and further costs are imposed because the 
systems inefficiently restrict the normal sharing of corporate 
information.247 In a related manner, whistleblowing can 
undermine the organizational chain of command, which may 
reduce the efficiencies gained by having a clear corporate 
decision-making structure.248 In fact, any decrease in the 
authority of management imposes costs, as managers must spend 
additional time justifying themselves and their commands.249 
Reduced morale, among both executives and employees, also may 
lead to less productivity and efficiency.  In its extreme version, 
this argument analogizes a culture of whistleblowing to the type 
of informing that is encouraged by tyrannical regimes.250 
245 See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 5, at 333; Miethe & Rothschild, supra note 
9, at 343. 
246 See Blumberg, supra note 239, at 297. 
247 See id.; Kraakman, supra note 19, at 60. 
248 See JOHNSON, supra note 231, at 75. 
249 See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 9-10; see also Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 
A.2d 174, 178 (Pa. 1974) (denying whistleblower claim because whistleblower bypassed 
immediate supervisors in his reporting and breached the chain of command; approving 
of the company discharging him “to preserve administrative order in its own home”). 
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Certainly an overly-rigorous surveillance program may lead 
to “risk-aversion, frustration and fears about being second-
guessed.”251 Yet, the effect of increased encouragement of 
whistleblowing on a corporation’s culture is debatable.  As an 
initial matter, the concern that encouraging whistleblowing will 
cause corporate disruption seems to lack demonstrable support in 
the extensive social science research regarding whistleblowers.252 
As mentioned above, this research supports the opposite 
conclusion that whistleblowers typically are loyal employees 
dedicated to the organization’s goals.253 Furthermore, most 
employees are accustomed to surveillance by managers and other 
superiors through performance reviews and evaluative metrics, 
such that additional monitoring is unlikely to affect morale 
negatively.  Moreover, the Structural Model encourages 
whistleblowing within the corporate system, which should work 
to maintain corporate secrets rather than reveal them to outsiders.  
Sarbanes-Oxley’s emphasis on internal whistleblowing also 
should keep the potential for organizational disruptions to a 
minimum because it reinforces, rather than undermines, the 
corporate hierarchy.  By providing information to the board of 
directors rather than to corporate management, Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
Structural Model emphasizes the primacy of the board of 
directors as a regulatory player in the corporate structure.  
4.  Increasing Employee Voice 
Whistleblower disclosure channels also benefit corporate 
employees by giving them greater voice through an additional 
avenue of participation in corporate governance.254 With union 
membership on the decline, the opportunity for employee 
participation in the workplace has been greatly reduced, leading 
to higher worker turnover and lower worker satisfaction.255 
Providing the employee more voice and participation in the 
 
251 See Langevoort, supra note 27, at 309. 
252 See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 303-04 (summarizing research and 
concluding that “[f]ears that internal whistleblowing is disruptive of employee control 
and productivity, or that it serves purely private interests, are unsupported by social-
psychological research”) (footnotes omitted). 
253 Id. at 303. 
254 See Dworkin, supra note 103, at 459; Estlund, supra note 9, at 108 (“[E]mployee 
participation in workplace governance is increasingly viewed as both an intrinsic and an 
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255 See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR 
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 29 (1990); Samuel Issacharoff, Reconstructing Employment, 104 
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workplace, such as through increased encouragement of 
whistleblowing, can lead to longer employee tenure and less 
turnover.256 Because work is where people get much of their 
“sense of community and self-worth,” increased involvement in 
corporate governance is valuable for employees.257 Stability is 
also enhanced by the increased morale and loyalty that occurs 
“when employees understand that they can stop wrongful 
conduct and contribute to shaping a working environment in 
which they can take pride.”258 Additionally, corporations benefit 
from a cooperative relationship with its employees; such a 
relationship increases corporate productivity by encouraging 
employees to develop firm-specific skills and increasing employee 
efficiency.259 
Yet, this relationship between employees and employers 
needs structure to develop and to be fully realized,260 and 
providing structural encouragement for employee voice through 
whistleblowing is a good beginning.  Incorporating employees as 
part of the corporate governance system is not as anomalous as it 
may sound.  Suggestions have been made for decades to involve 
employees more in corporate governance.261 For example, much 
of the union movement has rested upon employees becoming 
more involved in their working conditions.  The movement to 
broaden corporate accountability to its “stakeholders” rather than 
only its “shareholders” recognizes employees as important 
players in the corporation.262 Although employee-designated 
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and representative structures with power within the workplace.”). 
261 See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New Millennium: 
Redefining a Labor Organization Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1651, 
1653-54 n.8 (1999) (discussing team-based workplaces). 
262 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State 
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 48-50 (1991). 
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directors are rare in the United States,263 some large employers 
initiate “employee participation programs,” in which employees 
are involved in cooperative efforts with corporate management.264 
In fact, encouraging whistleblowing regarding financial crime 
may find more success than previous attempts to encourage 
employee voice regarding other corporate misconduct, because 
those previous attempts were adversarial at their core.  Employee 
voice through unionization traditionally has been met with 
hostility by management because of a union’s perceived negative 
effect on profitability.  Similarly, previous efforts to encourage 
whistleblowing regarding the health and safety of the public or its 
employees required the corporation to internalize costs it might 
rather externalize.  For example, dumping toxic waste illegally 
might be cheaper for corporations than doing so in compliance 
with government regulations.  Having a less safe work 
environment or underpaying employees for overtime might seem 
less expensive than complying with employee safety and wages 
legislation.  With these types of activities, there is an inherent 
conflict of interest in asking corporations to encourage their 
employees to expose misconduct when corporations will lose 
money if the misconduct is exposed.  Financial crime, however, 
less clearly benefits the corporation and its shareholders.  
Encouraging whistleblowing regarding financial crime, which by 
its nature adheres to the benefit of the shareholders, might be 
easier to implement because the corporation’s self-interest is 
involved.   
V. STRENGTHENING THE STRUCTURAL MODEL 
A.  Mandating the Model Effectively 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the first attempt to mandate a 
whistleblower disclosure channel in the private sector.  Yet, 
despite its broad application to all publicly-traded corporations, 
Sarbanes-Oxley fails to detail any specifics regarding the 
disclosure channel.  The Act requires only a single channel for 
employees of public companies to report questionable accounting 
 
263 See Gordon, supra note 69, at 1243 (noting that an exception to this rule is 
employee-owned United Air Lines). 
264 See, e.g., LeRoy, supra note 261, at 1661-66; Robert B. Moberly, The Story of 
Electromation, in LABOR LAW STORIES 315, 320-22 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds. 
2005). 
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or auditing matters.265 This mandatory implementation is 
important and necessary, but is too limited in scope. 
To be sure, government-mandated whistleblower regulation 
imposes upon corporate autonomy and an employer’s 
relationship with its employees.  In fact, this burden traditionally 
has been justified only where a public good is being served by 
whistleblowers.266 In these cases, government protection is 
necessary because  corporations likely will not reap the benefit of 
reporting conduct that harms the public, such as violations of 
environmental laws or improper use of government funds, and 
therefore has no incentive to encourage it.267 Consistent with this 
rationale, common law courts typically provide greater 
protections to whistleblowers who disclose information that 
affects a public, rather than a private, interest.268 When only a 
private corporate interest is at stake, such as with fraud against 
shareholders or internal corporate theft, whistleblowers have not 
fared well on claims of wrongful discharge in violation of public 
policy.269 In these “private interest” cases, it is arguable that a 
 
265 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(B) (Supp. 2002). 
266 See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 231, at 75; Schwab, supra note 211, at 1945 
(discussing protection of whistleblowers who report activities that have “third-party” 
effects). 
267 See Schwab, supra note 211, at 1970.  As put by Dean Schwab in 1996, five years 
before Enron declared bankruptcy: 
Certainly, a billion-dollar financial fraud involving elderly pensioners 
can have greater harm on third parties than a trivial oil spill.  But in 
general, companies have great internal incentives to police financial 
fraud, either to protect their shareholders or their reputation among 
creditors.  Companies often cannot capture the gains from an action that 
protects public health or safety, and thus that factor often remains 
external to their calculus.  Allowing a wrongful discharge action to be 
asserted by employees fired for blowing the whistle on actions against 
public health and safety is one small way to encourage companies to 
internalize these costs. 
Id.; see also Cynthia Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. 
REV. 1655, 1674 (1996) (asserting that actions that are protected from retaliation benefit 
third-parties and are “public goods that are likely to be ‘underproduced’ even without 
the threat of retaliation”). 
268 See Schwab, supra note 211, at 1970. 
269 For example, whistleblowers who report financial wrongdoing have not been 
particularly successful in wrongful discharge suits.  See, e.g., Adler v. Am. Standard 
Corp., 830 F.2d 1303, 1305-07 (4th Cir. 1987) (upholding discharge of employee for 
preparing to disclose commercial bribery and alteration of records);  Fox v. MCI 
Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 860-61 (Utah 1997) (finding that employee was not 
wrongfully discharged because employee’s internal disclosure regarding statutory 
violations did not implicate a clear and substantial public policy); Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 
905 P.2d 778, 788 (Okla. 1995) (refusing to protect employee who internally reported 
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corporation is due more deference in its treatment of 
whistleblowers because the corporation has the incentive to 
determine how much whistleblowing should be permitted and 
encouraged.270 
This same argument can be expanded to question the need for 
the government to mandate structural changes to corporations to 
encourage whistleblowing.  Thus, the argument goes, if the 
Structural Model provides such benefits to the corporation by 
encouraging whistleblowers, then perhaps the law should not 
require these reforms.  The smart, self-interested corporations will 
adopt efficient whistleblowing disclosure channels and prosper, 
while those entities that do not encourage whistleblowing will 
founder.   
This argument has some superficial appeal.  Indeed, the work 
of the market in requiring whistleblower reforms already can be 
seen in the aftermath of the corporate scandals.  Various investor 
and industry groups pressured corporations to utilize their 
employees to help detect fraud and other criminal activity.  For 
example, in 2005 a group of institutional shareholders of Wal-
Mart requested that the company review its internal controls, in 
part because of concern that the company weakened the resolve of 
its employees to report wrongdoing when Wal-Mart fired an 
employee who disclosed alleged accounting abuse by the 
corporate vice-chairman.271 Similarly, the chairman of Nortel 
Networks recently disclosed that no employee at any level of the 
company alerted the board to accounting improprieties that were 
revealed the previous year.272 In response, the corporation 
publicized to its shareholders that it voluntarily instituted a 
“whistleblower system” for employees to raise concerns to an 
officer that reports directly to the CEO and the chairman of the 
 
embezzlement by a supervisor); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380 (Cal. 
1988) (same).   
270 See Schwab, supra note 211, at 1949 (noting that a corporation “is in the best 
position to weigh whether the information the employer gains from co-worker tattling is 
worth the cost of breakdowns in the corporate chain of command and reduced trust 
among coworkers”). 
271 See James Covert, Wal-Mart Urged to Review Controls, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2005, 
at B7 (quoting a representative of an institutional investor as saying “[i]ndependent 
directors need to demonstrate to shareholders that Wal-Mart hasn’t built an ostrich 
culture – where employees are better off sticking their heads in the sand than speaking 
up”). 
272 See David Paddon, Nortel Shareholders Vent Anger Over Fallen Stock Price, 
Accounting Scandal, THE CANADIAN PRESS (June 29, 2005), available at 
http://news.yahoo.com/s/cpress/20050630/ca_pr-on-bu/Nortel_6&printer=1;_ylt+ 
ArhFOh. 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model 
3/5/2006 Page 56 
 
board.273 Other market forces may encourage whistleblowers to 
report matters externally if internal whistleblowers are not 
supported.  A non-profit group called Wal-Mart Watch recently 
placed thousands of phone calls to Bentonville, Arkansas, where 
Wal-Mart is headquartered, attempting to encourage employees 
“who know of wrongdoing” inside the company to come forward 
with information.274 In short, from the “free market” perspective, 
the market and other non-governmental forces can and do 
provide incentives to corporations to encourage the disclosure of 
internal fraud by their employees. 
However, these market forces often do not work effectively.275 
Although the market has begun pressuring large corporations to 
encourage whistleblowers, several barriers exist that may prevent 
corporations from voluntarily implementing a sufficient system.  
For example, it may be efficient for corporations not to monitor 
effectively, because the law may under-enforce certain regulations 
(either because there is imperfect monitoring so detection of 
misconduct is limited, or because penalties are set too low, or 
both), thus encouraging certain wrongdoing that is profitable.276 
Further, it is unlikely that the majority of public companies will 
draw the type of media and investor scrutiny that Wal-Mart has 
encountered.  Additionally, managers may implement less-than-
effective monitoring systems because they personally benefit from 
certain undetected misconduct but do not incur costs from 
violations by subordinates.277 Moreover, even if directors and 
officers of a corporation believe that it would benefit from 
increased monitoring by its employees, it may face costs in that a 
corporation’s supervisors may resent increased monitoring and 
supervision.  By mandating a structural whistleblowing approach, 
the law can relieve pressure on a corporation and lessen the extent 
 
273 Id. In addition, Volkswagen AG recently responded to disclosures of alleged 
bribery and other wrongdoing by corporate executives by announcing that it would hire 
two ombudsmen to receive anonymous employee complaints.  See Stephen Power, 
Volkswagen Strengthens Controls In Wake of Internal Bribery Probe, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12-13, 
2005, at A4. 
274 See John Harwood, Washington Wire: Help Wanted, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2005, at 
A4. 
275 Securities regulation is justified, in part, because a collective action problem 
often prevents dispersed shareholders from implementing reforms that could better 
protect their interests.  See McDonnell, supra note 178, at 535. 
276 See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 80. 
277 See id. 
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to which supervisors may feel that their employer is imposing a 
whistleblowing system because it does not trust them.278 
Furthermore, despite the private-public line that some courts 
attempt to draw,279 reducing illegal corporate fraud actually 
affects the larger public interest as well as the corporate private 
interest.280 Corporate fraud undermines the public’s confidence in 
the financial market and reduces the market’s transparency and 
security.281 Moreover, today’s modern corporations are the 
centers of economic universes and corporate fraud can harm 
entire communities – not only corporate shareholders.282 Given 
their large effect on the public interest, it may be that 
whistleblowers are actually more necessary in the private sector 
than in the public sphere.  As Phillip Blumberg noted over three 
decades ago, in the public sphere, an opposition party usually will 
be able to provide oversight regarding the administration of the 
 
278 See Cunningham, supra note 142, at 293 (“Mandatory controls serve a sanitizing 
function for modulating the trust-suspicion trade-off.  Controls mandated by law may 
be imposed by the corporation on employees without expressing a particularized 
mistrust of them.”); Sturm, supra note 130, at 520-21 (noting that the law can help 
“justify the implementation of initiatives lacking short-term economic pay-off, and 
legitim[ize] the pursuit of ethical values of fairness and respectful treatment in the 
workplace”). 
279 See Schwab, supra note 211, at 1949 (explaining that the private/public 
distinction is often more conclusory than helpful). 
280 See id. at 1970 (noting that “legislature presumably declared the act illegal in 
order to protect the public from wrongdoing”). 
281 See 148 CONG. REC. S7352, S7360 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 – Conference Report).  As noted by the SEC when it issued rules requiring that 
audit committees set up a system to receive employee complaints, “[v]igilant and 
informed oversight by a strong, effective and independent audit committee could help 
to counterbalance pressures to misreport results and impose increased discipline on the 
process of preparing financial information.  Improved oversight may help detect 
fraudulent financial reporting earlier and perhaps thus deter it or minimize its effects.  
All of these benefits imply increased market efficiency due to improved information and 
investor confidence in the reliability of a company’s financial disclosure and system of 
internal controls.” See SEC Release, supra note 147, at 18,813. 
282 Thousands of Enron employees lost their jobs and, as a group, Enron 
employees lost over $1 billion in retirement accounts containing a high proportion of 
Enron stock.  See Kroger, supra note 26, at 58.  Local businesses that relied on Enron and 
its employees were negatively affected.  See Kate Murphy, Corporate Lepers, Local Heroes?,
BUS. WK. ONLINE, available at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/ 
jun2005/nf20050630_0279_db017.htm (June 30, 2005) (“Enron employees who lost their 
jobs and retirement savings weren’t the only people hurt.  From local Porsche dealers to 
caterers, graphic designers, and travel agents, many folks either went out of business or 
took a tremendous hit because of what happened at Enron.”); cf. Blumberg, supra note 
239, at 299 (noting that large corporations can have characteristics of a private 
government because of their large revenues and substantial number of employees and 
shareholders). 
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government.283 In a corporation, however, a whistleblower may 
be more necessary because management may not be controllable 
by shareholders or a board of directors.284 If effect on the public 
interest is the sine qua non of government intervention, then 
reducing corporate fraud should satisfy this standard, particularly 
in light of the significant public impact of the recent corporate 
scandals.   
Thus, the government can address weaknesses of the “free 
market” approach by imposing some structural reform.285 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s mandatory approach to whistleblower 
disclosure channels improves upon previous versions of the 
Structural Model, which provided only weak incentives for 
corporations to implement structural change. 
But, how much regulation should there be?  Section 301 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley imposes a minimalist version of the Structural 
Model: it requires only that a public company’s audit committee 
establish procedures for receiving complaints, including 
confidential, anonymous concerns from employees, regarding 
accounting issues.286 In many ways, not requiring any specific 
procedures makes sense.  Small corporations may prefer to 
outsource the complaint procedure to a third-party to handle 
“hotline” calls.  Others may determine that they want a more 
investigative function, and appoint ombudsmen or ethics officers 
with broad responsibilities and reporting obligations.  In fact, 
behavioral research suggests that an organization’s structure 
greatly impacts the type of encouragement necessary to effectively 
encourage whistleblowing, such that a range of approaches may 
be successful.287 This diversity of options works well in an 
economy with a wide variety of workplaces.  Flexibility 
encourages experimentation with a range of processes, and 
 
283 See Blumberg, supra note 239, at 306. 
284 See id. 
285 To the extent a mandatory system remains unappealing, certain required 
disclosures could still encourage the development of whistleblower systems.  For 
example, rather than mandate certain disclosure systems, regulators could develop a list 
of “best practices” for such compliance systems.  Corporations could comply with these 
practices or disclose why they do not.  Cf. Paredes, supra note 18, at 526 (suggesting such 
a system for corporate governance more broadly).  Although this is a second-best 
option, it may prove more viable in a regime where mandatory regulation is disfavored. 
286 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(m)(4) (Supp. 2002). 
287 See Granville King, The Implications of an Organization’s Structure on 
Whistleblowing, 20 J. BUS. ETHICS 315, 324 (1999). 
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ultimately will help develop various best practices for industries 
and companies.288 
However, in order to realize the full potential of the Structural 
Model as a means of improving corporate governance, certain 
specifics could be fleshed out and expanded upon through 
legislation or regulation.  In particular, Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
vagueness contributes to two significant problems with its 
Structural Model.   
The first problem is that the Model may not work well enough.
Specifically, without supplemental requirements, it may be too 
easy for corporations to implement a system that looks acceptable 
on paper, but that is not functional or effective in reality.  As 
demonstrated above, this problem contributed to the failure of the 
Model prior to the corporate scandals, and Sarbanes-Oxley does 
not fix the problem sufficiently.289 
Conversely, the second problem is that the Model may work 
too well. Employees may make too many complaints about 
matters that do not merit director investigation.  In other words, a 
powerful Structural Model may provide too much information, 
often called “noise,” with only a fraction of the information 
actually proving useful.  Busy corporate directors and officers 
may spend an inefficient amount of time responding to 
insubstantial employee complaints.   
The future success of Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model 
depends upon addressing both of these concerns.  Below, I 
suggest solutions that involve mandating slightly more structure 
than is currently imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley.  These suggestions 
are aimed at achieving an efficient level of information flow to 
directors, while still permitting corporations flexibility in 
constructing whistleblower disclosure systems that work best for 
their organizational configuration. 
B.  Addressing the Cheating Problem 
Perhaps the most widely cited problem with internal 
compliance systems is that it can be easy for a corporation to 
“cheat” by implementing a superficial and ineffective system.290 
288 See Sturm, supra note 130, at 492 (discussing structural systems to address 
employment discrimination issues and criticizing a “one-size-fits-all model or a 
predetermined set of criteria,” because it would “cut off the process of organizational 
development and experimentation that is so crucial to an effective regulatory system”). 
289 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
290 See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 144, at 675; Krawiec, supra note 142, at 491; 
Langevoort, supra note 181, at 107. 
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The effectiveness of a system is difficult for outsiders to judge, 
specifically courts, prosecutors, or other administrative agencies, 
because “the indicia of an effective compliance system are easily 
mimicked.”291 Given the difficulty of accurate and thorough 
outside evaluation, corporations may install programs that look 
good on paper and permit them to check the necessary 
compliance boxes, but have little or no effect on whether 
individuals in an organization commit less crime.292 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model suffers from this same 
criticism in that it would be relatively easy for a corporation to 
implement a “disclosure channel” for whistleblower reporting, 
yet implicitly discourage the use of the channel by director 
inattentiveness to complaints, lack of publicity of the procedures 
necessary to utilize the program, or subtle retaliation against 
employees who report misconduct.  Given the relative weakness 
of anti-retaliation laws to protect the more subtle forms of 
discouragement, this cheating problem may undermine the 
effectiveness of the Structural Model if it is not addressed. 
Tools typically found in the corporate regulatory regime can 
be utilized to improve Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model, reduce 
the ability of corporations to cheat, and thus remedy this defect.  
As discussed in detail below, two such tools – disclosure and 
incentives - may significantly mitigate the cheating problem.  
First, corporations could be required to disclose information 
regarding their whistleblowing channels.  This disclosure could 
include both a description of the structure of the channel as well 
as a summary of evaluative metrics about the performance of the 
structure.  Second, corporations could be given more incentive to 
implement a fully developed and effective disclosure channel.  
One suggestion is that a corporation could be provided a safe 
harbor from certain claims if it satisfies certain whistleblower 
disclosure channel standards through a pre-approval process.  
Surprisingly, although these tools were used in other parts of 
Sarbanes-Oxley to bolster the Act’s reform efforts, they were not 
applied to support further encouragement of whistleblowers.293 
291 Krawiec, supra note 142, at 491-92; see also Langevoort, supra note 181, at 117-18. 
292 Cf. Langevoort, supra note 181, at 107 (criticizing “values-based” programs as 
being “easy to mimic, making it difficult to separate out the sincere programs from the 
fakes”), 113-14; Krawiec, supra note 142, at 487, 491 (noting that such programs may be 
mere “window-dressing,” and can have several negative effects, including an “under-
deterrence of corporate misconduct,” and “a proliferation of costly – but arguably 
ineffective – internal compliance structures”). 
293 See infra text accompanying notes 297-301. 
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1.  Disclosure of Structure and Results 
Cheating can be discouraged by requiring companies to 
disclose information regarding both the structure of their 
whistleblowing disclosure channel as well as the results arising 
from disclosures made through the channel.  As a further 
incentive to provide accurate information, these disclosures could 
be certified by the head of the audit committee, in the same 
manner that other important corporate information requires 
executive level certification when it is disclosed to the public.294 
These disclosures also could be posted internally, similarly to 
other federal employment law posting requirements,295 so that 
employees have direct knowledge of the procedures and results of 
employee whistleblowing. 
Disclosure and transparency are important principles of 
limited government regulation of markets.296 Accordingly, 
Sarbanes-Oxley recognizes that other areas related to internal 
enforcement should be disclosed.297 Under Title IV of Sarbanes-
Oxley, disclosures related to various financial and ethical 
obligations are required.298 For example, a corporation must 
disclose whether or not it has adopted a code of ethics for senior 
financial officers,299 as well as any change in or waiver of the code 
for these officers.300 Sarbanes-Oxley also requires that a 
corporation’s annual report must contain an “internal control 
report” that contains an assessment of the effectiveness of its 
internal control structure.301 As they relate to whistleblowers, 
however, these provisions are narrowly drawn.  A code of ethics 
would not necessarily involve whistleblowers and the disclosures 
for internal controls relate only to financial reporting, which likely 
 
294 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 302 & 906, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 & 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1350 (Supp. 2002) (requiring personal certification by officers of various publicly 
disclosed reports). 
295 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10 (requiring the posting of notice to employees 
regarding legal protections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
296 Backer, supra note 228, at 331 n.8; Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, 
Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 
861 (2003). 
297 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 745 (stating that 
purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to “protect investors by improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws”). 
298 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§401-409, (codified in scattered section of 15 
U.S.C.) (Supp. 2002). 
299 See id., § 406(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a). 
300 See id., § 406(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7264(b). 
301 See id., § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262. 
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would not detail the structure of a whistleblower disclosure 
channel.  Furthermore, in practice these disclosures from 
management are little more than boilerplate attestations from 
executives.302 
More could be required regarding the disclosure of 
whistleblower channels.  SEC regulations could require 
publication of a description of the individuals responsible for top-
level review of complaints from employee whistleblowers, and 
how that review is accomplished, such as whether entire files are 
reviewed at that level or whether and how files are screened.  
Further, corporations could reveal whether the disclosure system 
is provided internally or is outsourced (and to whom), the method 
by which employees are encouraged to report misconduct, and 
the means by which employee concerns are evaluated and 
investigated.303 In other words, relatively specific information 
about the system could be disclosed.  As with other regular 
corporate disclosures, disclosures relating to the whistleblower 
system could be required in a corporation’s periodic or annual 
reports, as well as on corporate websites.304 
Of course, disclosure is not the answer to every problem.  
Disclosure may be costly for corporations because compiling and 
presenting the required information accurately can be an 
enormous undertaking.  Currently, corporations are revolting 
against Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirement that they disclose their 
internal financial controls because they claim the costs are 
 
302 See, e.g., THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 115 (2005), available at 
http://ir.thecoca-colacompany.com (noting that “management believes that the 
Company maintained effective internal control over financial reporting as of 
December 31, 2004”). 
303 See Comments of William F. Ezzell, CPA, Chairman, Board of Directors & 
Barry C. Melancon, CPA President and CEO, American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, February 18, 2003, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
s70203/wfezzell1.htm (providing comments to SEC regarding its implementation of 
Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) (“The company should annually disclose 
whether or not they have a system in place, and whether that system relies on internal 
resources, or they have engaged an external service provider. If substantive changes are 
made to the procedures during the year, that fact should be reported via Form 8-k and 
the next annual disclosure should provide similar detail.”). 
304 Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC regulations currently require other information about 
a corporation to be posted on corporate websites, such as statements related to the 
beneficial ownership of securities of a corporation.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(16) (Supp. 2002); 
17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.406 (permitting posting of required 
corporate code of ethics to corporate website).  Similarly, the New York Stock Exchange 
requires each of its listed companies to post its code of business conduct and ethics on 
their corporate website.  See New York Stock Exchange Corporate Governance Rules, 
Section 303A, NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 10. 
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staggering.305 Moreover, too much disclosure to the market may 
produce too much information for investors, such that the 
marginal benefit of the disclosed information to investors does not 
justify the increased cost to the corporation of making the 
disclosure.306 
However, disclosure of the systems, and the subsequent 
certification of such disclosures by the audit committee, has many 
benefits.  Such disclosure will reduce the temptation to implement 
systems that can function as mere window-dressing, an easy way 
to avoid truly encouraging whistleblowers.  With more public 
disclosure, corporations (and signatory directors) will face 
financial and possible criminal exposure if the whistleblower 
system does not mirror its public description.   
Certified public disclosures also would provide shareholders 
the opportunity to assess the effort corporations undertake to 
prevent fraud.307 Shareholders may prefer companies in which 
whistleblowing is encouraged through extensive whistleblower 
systems, because strong internal control systems may lead to less 
regulatory oversight308 as well as easier access to capital through 
more positive assessments from credit-rating agencies.309 In this 
way, disclosure can provide signaling benefits because it sends “a 
 
305 See Deborah Solomon, At What Price?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R3.   
306 See Comments of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, February 18, 2003, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/pricewater1.htm (providing comments 
to SEC regarding its implementation of Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley) (“While we 
acknowledge the fact that these disclosures may be meaningful to investors, we believe 
that there needs to be a balance between relevant information and information 
overload.”). 
307 See Schmidt, supra note 222, at 26-29 (arguing that disclosure of compliance 
policies will put market pressure on corporations to institute whistleblower protections); 
cf. Ribstein, supra note 17, at 291 (“A fully informed market arguably ought to be able to 
evaluate the adequacy of firms’ monitoring and control mechanisms and to encourage 
firms to efficiently balance the costs and benefits of adopting additional controls.”). 
308 See Painter, supra note 230, at 268 (noting that regulators have limited 
enforcement budgets and might direct enforcement activity towards actors it believes 
have not given proper incentives to encourage internal reporting, thus reducing costs 
because a regulator might “require less frequent and less burdensome reporting, request 
fewer documents, and conduct less extensive investigations”); Diya Gullapalli, Living 
With Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R1, R3 (noting that Dow Chemical 
strengthened its relationship with “key regulators at the SEC and the accounting-
oversight board” by developing a “reputation for transparency and activism in 
compliance”). 
309 Cf. Painter, supra note 230, at 272 (“Most investors cannot themselves acquire, 
process, and verify all relevant information about issuers whose securities they 
purchase.  The amount they would spend doing so would not be justified by the return.  
Investors thus rely, to a great extent, on ‘reputational intermediaries,” such as bond 
rating agencies, investment advisors, and investment banks to cost-effectively tap into 
the information market on their behalf.”). 
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positive message to shareholders and regulators about checks on 
management’s conduct.”310 To the extent shareholders value 
strong internal control systems, the required disclosure of 
whistleblower polices could encourage managers to implement 
enhanced internal controls to increase the company’s 
attractiveness to shareholders.311 Public information about weak 
internal controls, on the other hand, will inform shareholders 
about riskier investments with the greater potential for fraud.312 
Moreover, disclosure of whistleblower procedures will 
encourage employees to report misconduct by giving them 
explicit instruction on the best means of making whistleblower 
complaints.313 Under the current Sarbanes-Oxley version of the 
Structural Model, there is no obligation to publicize the existence 
of the disclosure procedures, which may cause employees to  
underutilize the whistleblower channel.  This omission is odd 
given the utilization of such required disclosures to employees in 
other federal employment statutes, such as Title VII.314 
In addition to disclosing information regarding the structure 
of the system, corporations could be required to disclose the 
results of their whistleblower disclosure system.  Specifically, 
corporations could disclose information such as the number of 
complaints received by the system, the types of complaints 
(accounting, theft, discrimination, work conditions, etc.), and the 
resolution or procedural posture of the complaints (found to be 
without merit, substantiated, etc.).315 Corporations could be 
further required to disclose the current employment status of 
employees who submitted complaints to clarify whether 
whistleblowers suffer any tangible employment action during a 
 
310 Id. at 256.  But see Comments of Charles M. Nathan, Committee on Securities 
Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, February 18, 2003, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/cmnathan1.htm (providing 
comments to SEC regarding its implementation of Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley) (“The 
Committee also recommends that listed companies be allowed to choose whether or not 
they disclose their procedures for handling complaints as such procedures are not in the 
ordinary course of interest to investors or shareholders.”). 
311 See Coffee, supra note 25, at 1277-78. 
312 Cf. MICELI & NEAR, supra note 6, at 14 (“[I]nvestors and potential investors who 
are warned of financial wrongdoing may avoid the loss of substantial resources by 
investing in more ethical or better managed organizations.”). 
313 See Near & Dworkin, supra note 113, at 1557; Memo. from Larry D. Thompson, 
Deputy Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep’t Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Attys., 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), at 10, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_organizations.pdf. 
314 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-10. 
315 Cf. Callahan, et al., supra note 125, at 210 (proposing that ombudsmen prepare 
summaries of complaints received, the investigation, and any actions taken). 
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restricted period after they disclose information.316 Some 
organizations already use these types of metrics to evaluate their 
internal compliance systems.317 For example, Intel measures the 
utilization rate of their internal dispute resolution system, the 
number of internal versus external complaints, the type of 
complaints and their resolutions, and the perceived effectiveness 
of the system as measured by employee and manager feedback.318 
Analogously, under the NO FEAR Act, federal agencies disclose 
statistics regarding the number and type of discrimination 
complaints each agency received from its employees, including 
the results of those complaints.319 
Publication of specific results from a whistleblower disclosure 
system is important for several reasons.  First, disclosing specific 
results will avoid a “lemons” problem that might develop, 
whereby companies may be unable to signal that they have 
superior whistleblowing procedures if companies with inferior 
procedures can send similar signals.320 Companies, in other 
words, will be put to their proof regarding the results from their 
system, and not merely be able to rely on impressive looking 
window-dressing.  Corporations will be forced to explain and to 
justify their disclosure channel structure, as well as their own 
evaluation of the structure’s effectiveness.321 
Second, these public explanations from corporations will 
assist in developing “best practices” and promote 
experimentation, while also providing courts and regulators a 
 
316 Auditors already are protected through a similar mechanism in which 
corporations must report the discharge of an outside accountant.  See Schedule 8-K. 
317 One recent survey found that 75% of U.S. public companies tracked whether 
their ethical codes were followed.  See Neil Baker, All Done With Mirrors? Transparency 
and Business Ethics, INTERN’L BAR NEWS, at 5 (Aug. 2005). 
318 See Sturm, supra note 130, at 559 (describing Intel’s assessment techniques).  
Intel is certainly not alone in its attempt to evaluate the success of its own disclosure 
program.  See Kenneth D. Martin, Where Theory and Reality Converge: Three Corporate 
Experiences in Developing “Effective” Compliance Programs, in GOOD CITIZEN, supra note 3, 
at 39-40 (describing metrics kept by Sundstrand Corp. regarding its compliance 
program). 
319 See Notification and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation Act 
of 2002, Pub. L. 107-174, 116 Stat. 566, §§ 203; 301 (2002). 
320 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); see also Painter, supra note 230, at 275-76 
(describing this problem in a market for attorneys who must report wrongdoing). 
321 Cf. Sturm, supra note 130, at 559 (describing a system whereby courts examine 
the effectiveness of an internal grievance system by requiring employers “to develop 
and justify criteria of effectiveness in problem solving for their own internal systems,” 
thereby encouraging “employers to evaluate their own systems, rewarding employers 
who do so”). 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model 
3/5/2006 Page 66 
 
viable means of judging the effectiveness of a corporation’s own 
system.322 
Third, publishing results from whistleblowing systems will 
provide employees with information regarding the effectiveness 
of their own monitoring efforts.  As discussed above, a significant 
disincentive for employees to report misconduct is their concern 
that nothing will be done about their report.323 Requiring 
companies to disclose the results of whistleblower disclosures will 
address this concern, because it will demonstrate that violators of 
ethical and legal norms will be held accountable.324 Moreover, in 
his work on “self-regulatory” approaches to promoting employee 
policy compliance, Tom Tyler has argued that employees are 
more willing to follow workplace rules and think positively about 
their employer when the organization demonstrates that it treats 
employees with procedural fairness.325 Thus, publicizing that the 
system “works” and that procedures are fairly administered not 
only can encourage employees to report misconduct, but also can 
persuade employees to behave more appropriately themselves.   
Fourth, publishing results can serve as an important impetus 
for reform.  For example, published results of whistleblower 
disclosures under the Civil Service Reform Act revealed that the 
Office of Special Counsel and the Merit Systems Protection Board 
failed to protect and encourage whistleblowers.  In the eleven 
years after passage of the CSRA, only one whistleblower received 
a hearing by the OSC to protect the whistleblower’s job.326 Only 
four whistleblowers (out of more than two thousand appeals) 
won on the merits after they appealed to the Merit Systems 
Protection Board.327 These statistics served as partial impetus for 
the passage of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, which 
 
322 See id.; cf. Langevoort, supra note 181, at 114-15 (noting that the “legal standard 
underlying an affirmative monitoring requirement should be set at a moderate height,” 
such as industry best practices); but see Comments of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 
February 18, 2003, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70203/clearygot1.htm (providing comments to 
SEC regarding its implementation of Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley) (“Disclosure about 
procedures and changes to those procedures may have an unintended chilling effect. If 
an issuer is forced to disclose its procedures, the audit committee may be less innovative 
and less willing to try different approaches.”). 
323 See supra text accompanying notes 170-72. 
324 See Trevino, supra note 25, at 1200. 
325 See Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in 
Work Settings: The Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287, 1303-05 
(2005). 
326 See Devine, supra note 140, at 534. 
327 See id. at 534. 
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addressed some of the perceived problems with the CSRA’s 
whistleblower system.328 
Perhaps understandably, corporations may resist disclosing 
these results.  Mandatory disclosure requires the corporation to 
reveal potentially embarrassing information publicly and may 
place employers at the mercy of disgruntled employees.  Further, 
disclosing results may have the opposite of the desired effect.  
Rather than increase whistleblower disclosures, it may pressure 
managers to suppress complaints in order to make a company’s 
numbers look better.329 Yet, such disclosure is not markedly 
different than requiring disclosure of earnings and revenue 
numbers that embarrass the corporation.  Both types of 
disclosures aim to present a clearer picture of the corporation to 
the investing public.  Moreover, as with financial numbers, there 
will be no restriction on a corporation’s truthful efforts to explain 
and to justify poor results.  
2.  Providing Incentive 
Corporations already receive limited incentives from the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines and various court decisions 
to implement internal compliance systems.  However, as 
discussed above, the usefulness of these incentives to create 
effective systems is questionable because the incentives do not 
necessarily prevent cheating.330 Another form of incentive may 
better encourage corporations to install and to enforce effective 
systems that encourage employee whistleblowers to come 
forward. 
Corporations could be provided a safe harbor for installing 
systems that met standards for effectiveness promulgated by the 
SEC or another administrative agency.  Such standards could 
include specific requirements, such as providing for an 
independent review of whistleblower claims and intensive 
training of managers.  This safe harbor could be granted through 
a pre-approval process in which an administrative agency, such as 
the SEC, or a certified third-party, such as a truly independent 
auditor, could rigorously investigate and evaluate systems for 
effectiveness.  This pre-approval process avoids the tricky 
 
328 See id. at 536 & 536 n.22; Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 138, at 282-83. 
329 Cf. Coffee, supra note 25, at 1251-65 (noting that disclosure can raise a 
corporation’s “embarrassment cost” to a “prohibitively high level” that may actually 
restrict information flow). 
330 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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proposition of courts and prosecutors evaluating a program 
externally after wrongdoing has occurred.   
The benefit for the corporation would be that, in criminal and 
civil litigation where proof of an effective whistleblower system is 
meaningful,331 the safe harbor could provide a rebuttable 
presumption that the system was effective.  The mechanism to 
implement this safe harbor would vary depending on the context.  
To apply to criminal sentencing, the OSG would need to be 
amended.332 To apply to discrimination cases or with regard to 
punitive damages, specific legislation may need to be passed to 
recognize such a safe harbor.  Yet, even without such legislation, 
courts may accept such certification as the industry standard 
when evaluating internal control systems, thereby serving the 
same function as a mandatory safe harbor provision. 
Corporations would still be encouraged to prevent 
wrongdoing through other means, because the presumption 
would not reduce a company’s vicarious liability for the acts of its 
employees.333 However, my proposal would provide incentive to 
implement a true whistleblower disclosure system by reducing a 
corporation’s exposure to the extreme punishments imposed 
upon corporations, such as criminal fines and punitive damages.  
This system would take the guess work out of complying with 
incentives-based programs, such as the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines, and also ensure that corporations spent an 
appropriate amount of resources on the system.334 
331 See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (providing affirmative 
defense in sexual harassment cases); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 
(1998) (same); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545-46 (1999) (protecting 
corporations with internal compliance systems from punitive damages); U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8B2.1, 8C2.5 (2004) (providing substantial reduction 
in penalties for corporation with effective compliance and ethics program). 
332 Admittedly, given that the Guidelines recently were amended in 2004 and the 
current uncertainty about their application, see U.S. v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 751 (2005) 
(finding that the Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment), any proposal to amend the 
Guidelines along these lines may have difficulty gaining sufficient support. 
333 See Langevoort, supra note 181, at 114-15 (noting that firms should not be 
absolved of vicarious liability simply for installing monitoring systems because firms 
need to internalize sanctions for wrongdoing in order to have incentive to develop 
sound compliance program). 
334 Cf. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 843 (1994) (noting that corporations will spend less on detection of 
criminal acts if there is not sufficient reduction in fines and penalties for these self-
enforcement efforts, because additional enforcement expenditures would increase 
expected criminal liability by detecting more crime). 
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C.  Addressing the Noise Problem 
A second problem with the Structural Model is that 
whistleblower disclosure channels may be too successful.  They 
may open the floodgates for employee dissatisfactions related to a 
wide-range of injustices, real and perceived.335 Indeed, a common 
occurrence after the introduction of a hotline or other disclosure 
channel is for employee complaints to increase.336 This “noise” 
problem could be a significant concern for any system that 
requires reporting to be channeled to directors, such as the system 
mandated by Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley.  Evidence is 
mounting that directors are becoming overly burdened by the 
requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley in general, and thus corporations 
may need to compensate directors more generously in order to 
find qualified and independent individuals to serve.337 A
particularly active whistleblower disclosure channel may only 
amplify these concerns. 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model can be improved to 
address this issue.  Specifically, the SEC could promulgate rules 
permitting (but not requiring) certain restrictions on the systems 
to reduce the burden on directors.  For example, the SEC could 
specify that directors may outsource the reporting requirement to 
a third-party or permit the corporation to install an ombudsman 
to supervise the system.  In either case, it would be important that 
the recipient of the whistleblower disclosures provide regular 
reports to the audit committee regarding the number and types of 
complaints made through the system.  Furthermore, the recipient 
should be responsible solely to the audit committee, not to a 
corporate executive.  This recipient, whether a third-party or an 
internal ombudsmen, would provide the audit committee with a 
valuable service.  At the same time, however, the audit committee 
would retain the independent control and review that is crucial to 
avoid managerial blocking and filtering of disclosures.   
Finally, the SEC could permit the audit committee to be 
shielded from disclosures regarding de minimis, or nonmaterial, 
offenses.  This limitation ensures that directors preserve oversight 
over the most important information, but are not overly burdened 
 
335 Cf. Sturm, supra note 130, at 502 (describing internal grievance system at Intel, 
which includes an employee call center that fields hundreds of thousands of calls). 
336 See, e.g., id. at 508 (noting that after the adoption of an internal grievance 
system at Intel, “the number of employee complaints increased substantially”). 
337 See James S. Linck, et al., Effects and Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act on Corporate Boards (August 31, 2005), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=687496, at 4 
(noting that small public firms are disproportionally impacted by these higher costs). 
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with insignificant complaints.  The limits placed on such 
disclosures could include only providing information to the audit 
committee that, if true, would necessitate public disclosure in 
order to comply with previous public filings.  Such a limit would 
essentially incorporate the definition of “materiality” from federal 
securities laws regulating public disclosure in other contexts. 
While these suggestions may, yet again, give discretion to a 
non-director to screen and filter whistleblower disclosures, the 
danger is minimized because independent directors ultimately 
would still be responsible for the system.  Directors, rather than 
corporate executives, would be responsible for determining what 
is “material” and what should be disclosed publicly.  Moreover, 
such limitations may simply be a practical necessity for large 
corporations with tens of thousands of employees. 
Approving certain restrictions to the disclosure system could 
save corporations from implementing overly rigorous and 
inefficient structures in an attempt to satisfy Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
ambiguous mandate.  For example, some corporations may not 
need all of the bells and whistles of a full ombudsman program 
and would benefit from the set cost of a third-party system.  Yet, 
given the vague mandate from Sarbanes-Oxley, these 
corporations may install a more expensive system in order to 
comply with the statute’s requirement.  Such a system may be 
more comprehensive, but may not provide any marginal benefit 
to either the corporation or its employees.  Providing absolute 
minimums for the disclosure channel permits a corporation to 
balance its need for directors to have time and energy to oversee 
the actual business activities of the corporation with Sarbanes-
Oxley’s requirement that these same directors have oversight of 
and responsibility for a whistleblower disclosure system.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The corporate scandals demonstrated that, despite the efforts 
of a few employee whistleblowers, many corporate employees 
failed to monitor their corporation’s behavior sufficiently and to 
report the misconduct they observed.  Problems with information 
flow from employees to traditional corporate monitors 
undermined the ability of employees to perform any monitoring 
role effectively.   
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model presents an improved 
attempt to encourage corporate employees to become corporate 
monitors and to overcome these flow-of-information problems.  
The model should lead to more employee whistleblowing, 
because it better corresponds with employee motivations and 
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reduces the most prominent disincentives to whistleblowing.  As 
important, the model should improve the effectiveness of 
whistleblower disclosures because it encourages reporting 
directly to independent corporate directors, who have the 
authority and responsibility to respond to information about 
wrongdoing. 
Yet, this better model has limitations that can be ameliorated.  
The vagueness of Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirements has the potential 
to both under- and over-produce whistleblower complaints.  As 
with other attempts to implement effective compliance systems, it 
will be possible for corporations to utilize disclosure systems that 
are mere “window-dressing,” thus resulting in too few 
disclosures.  Requiring corporations to publicly disclose 
information about their systems, and the results achieved through 
those systems, may reduce this cheating problem.  Additionally, 
permitting some safe harbor for corporations that satisfy a pre-
approval process may permit more external oversight of the 
effectiveness of whistleblower disclosure systems. 
Conversely, a direct channel to the board of directors may 
result in too many disclosures, which will overwhelm directors 
who already are under increasing pressure from Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
other regulatory requirements.  The SEC could explicitly permit 
directors to outsource their oversight of the whistleblower 
disclosure channel, as long as the responsibility for the channel 
remains with the directors.  Promulgating specific, approved 
restrictions and options may reduce the burden on directors, 
while still facilitating the transfer of information about corporate 
misconduct from front-line employees to the corporate monitors 
with the authority and responsibility to address the wrongdoing.  
These reforms will help Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model 
encourage employees to play an active role in monitoring 
corporate behavior – a role that not only will benefit society by 
reducing corporate misconduct, but also will improve corporate 
decision-making by increasing employee voice within the 
corporation. 
